draft-ietf-pana-pana-11.txt		draft-ietf-pana-pana-13.txt
PANA Working Group D. Forsberg		PANA Working Group D. Forsberg
Internet-Draft Nokia		Internet-Draft Nokia
Expires: September 4, 2006 Y. Ohba (Ed.)		Intended status: Standards Track Y. Ohba (Ed.)
Toshiba		Expires: June 9, 2007 Toshiba
B. Patil		B. Patil
Nokia		Nokia
H. Tschofenig		H. Tschofenig
Siemens		Siemens
A. Yegin		A. Yegin
Samsung		Samsung
March 3, 2006		December 6, 2006
Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access (PANA)		Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access (PANA)
draft-ietf-pana-pana-11		draft-ietf-pana-pana-13
Status of this Memo		Status of this Memo
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applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware		applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes		have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.		aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.
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Skipping to change at page 1, line 41:
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Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).		Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).
Abstract		Abstract
This document defines the Protocol for Carrying Authentication for		This document defines the Protocol for Carrying Authentication for
Network Access (PANA), a link-layer agnostic transport for Extensible		Network Access (PANA), a network-layer transport for Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP) to enable network access authentication		Authentication Protocol (EAP) to enable network access authentication
between clients and access networks. PANA protocol specification		between clients and access networks. PANA protocol specification
covers the client-to-network access authentication part of an overall		covers the client-to-network access authentication part of an overall
secure network access framework, which additionally includes other		secure network access framework, which additionally includes other
protocols and mechanisms for service provisioning, access control as		protocols and mechanisms for service provisioning, access control as
a result of initial authentication, and accounting.		a result of initial authentication, and accounting.
Table of Contents		Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.1. Specification of Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		1.1. Specification of Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		3. Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. Protocol Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		4. Protocol Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.1. Transport Layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		4.1. Transport Layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.2. Payload Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		4.2. High-Level Attribute-Value Pair Description . . . . . . . 10
4.3. Discovery and Handshake Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11		4.3. Handshake Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.4. Authentication and Authorization Phase . . . . . . . . . 15		4.4. Authentication and Authorization Phase . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.5. Access Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18		4.5. Access Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.6. Re-authentication Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19		4.6. Re-authentication Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.7. Termination Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20		4.7. Termination Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.8. Separate NAP and ISP Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . 21		5. Processing Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.8.1. Negotiating Separate NAP and ISP Authentication . . . 21		5.1. Fragmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.8.2. Execution of Separate NAP and ISP Authentication . . . 22		5.2. Sequence Number and Retransmission . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.8.3. AAA-Key Calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23		5.3. PANA Security Association . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5. Processing Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24		5.4. Message Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5.1. Fragmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24		5.5. Message Validity Check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5.2. Sequence Number and Retransmission . . . . . . . . . . . 24		5.6. PaC Updating its IP Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5.3. PANA Security Association . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25		5.7. Session Lifetime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5.4. Message Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27		5.8. Error Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5.5. Message Validity Check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27		6. Header Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.6. PaC-EP-Master-Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29		6.1. IP and UDP Headers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.7. Device ID Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29		6.2. PANA Message Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.8. PaC Updating its IP Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30		6.3. AVP Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5.9. Session Lifetime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31		7. PANA Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
5.10. Network Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31		7.1. PANA-Client-Initiation (PCI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
5.11. Error Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32		7.2. PANA-Start-Request (PSR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
6. Header Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33		7.3. PANA-Start-Answer (PSA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
6.1. IP and UDP Headers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33		7.4. PANA-Auth-Request (PAR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
6.2. PANA Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33		7.5. PANA-Auth-Answer (PAN) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
6.3. AVP Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35		7.6. PANA-Reauth-Request (PRR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
7. PANA Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39		7.7. PANA-Reauth-Answer (PRA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
7.1. PANA-PAA-Discover (PDI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41		7.8. PANA-Bind-Request (PBR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
7.2. PANA-Start-Request (PSR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42		7.9. PANA-Bind-Answer (PBA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
7.3. PANA-Start-Answer (PSA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42		7.10. PANA-Ping-Request (PPR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
7.4. PANA-Auth-Request (PAR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42		7.11. PANA-Ping-Answer (PPA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
7.5. PANA-Auth-Answer (PAN) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43		7.12. PANA-Termination-Request (PTR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
7.6. PANA-Reauth-Request (PRAR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43		7.13. PANA-Termination-Answer (PTA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
7.7. PANA-Reauth-Answer (PRAA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43		7.14. PANA-Error-Request (PER) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
7.8. PANA-Bind-Request (PBR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43		7.15. PANA-Error-Answer (PEA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
7.9. PANA-Bind-Answer (PBA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44		7.16. PANA-Update-Request (PUR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
7.10. PANA-Ping-Request (PPR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44		7.17. PANA-Update-Answer (PUA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
7.11. PANA-Ping-Answer (PPA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44		8. AVPs in PANA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
7.12. PANA-Termination-Request (PTR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45		8.1. Algorithm AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
7.13. PANA-Termination-Answer (PTA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45		8.2. AUTH AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
7.14. PANA-Error-Request (PER) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45		8.3. EAP-Payload AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
7.15. PANA-Error-Answer (PEA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45		8.4. Failed-AVP AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
7.16. PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request (PFER) . . . . . . . . . . . . 46		8.5. Failed-Message-Header AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
7.17. PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer (PFEA) . . . . . . . . . . . . 46		8.6. Key-Id AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
7.18. PANA-Update-Request (PUR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46		8.7. Nonce AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
7.19. PANA-Update-Answer (PUA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46		8.8. Result-Code AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
8. AVPs in PANA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48		8.8.1. Authentication Results Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
8.1. Algorithm AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50		8.8.2. Protocol Error Result Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
8.2. AUTH AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50		8.9. Session-Lifetime AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
8.3. Cookie AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51		8.10. Termination-Cause AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
8.4. Device-Id AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51		9. Retransmission Timers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
8.5. EAP-Payload AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51		9.1. Transmission and Retransmission Parameters . . . . . . . . 44
8.6. Failed-AVP AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51		10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
8.7. ISP-Information AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51		10.1. PANA UDP Port Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
8.8. Key-Id AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52		10.2. PANA Message Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
8.9. NAP-Information AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52		10.2.1. Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
8.10. Nonce AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52		10.2.2. Message Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
8.11. Notification AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53		10.2.3. Flags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
8.12. Post-PANA-Address-Configuration (PPAC) AVP . . . . . . . 53		10.3. AVP Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
8.13. Protection-Capability AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55		10.3.1. AVP Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
8.14. Provider-Identifier AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55		10.3.2. Flags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
8.15. Provider-Name AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55		10.4. AVP Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
8.16. Result-Code AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55		10.4.1. Result-Code AVP Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
8.16.1. Authentication Results Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55		10.4.2. Termination-Cause AVP Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
8.16.2. Protocol Error Result Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56		11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
8.17. Session-Id AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58		11.1. General Security Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
8.18. Session-Lifetime AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59		11.2. Handshake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
8.19. Termination-Cause AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59		11.3. EAP Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
9. Retransmission Timers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60		11.4. Cryptographic Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
9.1. Transmission and Retransmission Parameters . . . . . . . 61		11.5. Per-packet Ciphering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63		11.6. PAA-to-EP Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
10.1. PANA UDP Port Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63		11.7. Liveness Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
10.2. PANA Multicast Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63		11.8. IP Address Spoofing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
10.3. PANA Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63		11.9. Early Termination of a Session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
10.3.1. Message Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63		12. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
10.3.2. Flags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64		13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
10.4. AVP Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64		13.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
10.4.1. AVP Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64		13.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
10.4.2. Flags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65		Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
10.5. AVP Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65		Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 59
10.5.1. Post-PANA-Address-Configuration AVP Values . . . . . . 65
10.5.2. Protection-Capability AVP Values . . . . . . . . . . . 65
10.5.3. Result-Code AVP Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
10.5.4. Termination-Cause AVP Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
11.1. General Security Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
11.2. Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
11.3. EAP Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
11.4. Separate NAP and ISP Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . 69
11.5. Cryptographic Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
11.6. Per-packet Ciphering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
11.7. PAA-to-EP Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
11.8. Liveness Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
11.9. Updating PaC's IP Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
11.10. Early Termination of a Session . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
12. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
13.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
13.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
Appendix A. Example Sequence of Separate NAP and ISP
Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 80
1. Introduction		1. Introduction
Providing secure network access service requires access control based		Providing secure network access service requires access control based
on the authentication and authorization of the clients and the access		on the authentication and authorization of the clients and the access
networks. Client-to-network authentication provides parameters that		networks. Client-to-network authentication provides parameters that
are needed to police the traffic flow through the enforcement points.		are needed to police the traffic flow through the enforcement points.
A protocol is needed to carry authentication methods between the		A protocol is needed to carry authentication methods between the
client and the access network.		client and the access network.
Currently there is no standard network-layer solution for		Scope of this work is identified as designing a network layer
authenticating clients for network access. Appendix A of [RFC4058]
describes the problem statement that led to the development of PANA.
Scope of this work is identified as designing a link-layer agnostic
transport for network access authentication methods. The Extensible		transport for network access authentication methods. The Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP) [RFC3748] provides such authentication		Authentication Protocol (EAP) [RFC3748] provides such authentication
methods. In other words, PANA will carry EAP which can carry various		methods. In other words, PANA will carry EAP which can carry various
authentication methods. By the virtue of enabling transport of EAP		authentication methods. By the virtue of enabling transport of EAP
above IP, any authentication method that can be carried as an EAP		above IP, any authentication method that can be carried as an EAP
method is made available to PANA and hence to any link-layer		method is made available to PANA and hence to any link-layer
technology. There is a clear division of labor between PANA (an EAP		technology. There is a clear division of labor between PANA (an EAP
lower layer), EAP and EAP methods as described in [RFC3748].		lower layer), EAP and EAP methods as described in [RFC3748].
Various environments and usage models for PANA are identified in		Various environments and usage models for PANA are identified in
Appendix A of [RFC4058]. Potential security threats for network-		Appendix A of [RFC4058]. Potential security threats for
layer access authentication protocol are discussed in [RFC4016].		network-layer access authentication protocol are discussed in
These have been essential in defining the requirements [RFC4058] on		[RFC4016]. These have been essential in defining the requirements
the PANA protocol. Note that some of these requirements are imposed		[RFC4058] on the PANA protocol. Note that some of these requirements
by the chosen payload, EAP [RFC3748].		are imposed by the chosen payload, EAP [RFC3748].
There are components that are part of a complete secure network		There are components that are part of a complete secure network
access solution but are outside of the PANA protocol specification,		access solution but are outside of the PANA protocol specification,
including IP address configuration, authentication method choice,		including authentication method choice, data traffic protection,
filter rule installation, data traffic protection and PAA-EP		PAA-EP protocol, and PAA discovery. PANA authentication output is
protocol. These components are described in separate documents (see		used for creating access control filters. These components are
[I-D.ietf-pana-framework] and [I-D.ietf-pana-snmp]). The readers are		described in separate documents (see [I-D.ietf-pana-framework],
recommended to go through the PANA Framework document [I-D.ietf-pana-		[I-D.ietf-pana-snmp] and [I-D.ietf-dhc-paa-option]). The readers are
framework] prior to reading this protocol specification document.		recommended to read the PANA Framework document
		[I-D.ietf-pana-framework] prior to reading this protocol
		specification document.
1.1. Specification of Requirements		1.1. Specification of Requirements
In this document, several words are used to signify the requirements		In this document, several words are used to signify the requirements
of the specification. These words are often capitalized. The key		of the specification. These words are often capitalized. The key
words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD",		words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD",
"SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document		"SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document
are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].		are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2. Terminology		2. Terminology
PANA Client (PaC):		PANA Client (PaC):
The client side of the protocol that resides in the access device		The client side of the protocol that resides in the access device
(e.g., laptop, PDA, etc.). It is responsible for providing the		(e.g., laptop, PDA, etc.). It is responsible for providing the
credentials in order to prove its identity (authentication) for		credentials in order to prove its identity (authentication) for
network access authorization. The PaC and the EAP peer are co-		network access authorization. The PaC and the EAP peer are
located in the same access device.		co-located in the same access device.
PANA Authentication Agent (PAA):		PANA Authentication Agent (PAA):
The protocol entity in the access network whose responsibility is		The protocol entity in the access network whose responsibility is
to verify the credentials provided by a PANA client (PaC) and		to verify the credentials provided by a PANA client (PaC) and
authorize network access to the device associated with the client		authorize network access to the access device. The PAA and the
and identified by a Device Identifier (DI). The PAA and the EAP		EAP authenticator (and optionally the EAP server) are co-located
authenticator (and optionally the EAP server) are co-located in		in the same node. Note the authentication and authorization
the same node. Note the authentication and authorization		procedure can, according to the EAP model, also be offloaded to
procedure can, according to the EAP model, be also offloaded to
the backend AAA infrastructure.		the backend AAA infrastructure.
PANA Session:		PANA Session:
A PANA session begins with the handshake between the PANA Client		A PANA session begins with the handshake between the PANA Client
(PaC) and the PANA Authentication Agent (PAA), and terminates as a		(PaC) and the PANA Authentication Agent (PAA), and terminates as a
result of an authentication or liveness test failure, a message		result of an authentication or liveness test failure, a message
delivery failure after retransmissions reach maximum values,		delivery failure after retransmissions reach maximum values,
session lifetime expiration, or an explicit termination message.		session lifetime expiration, or an explicit termination message.
A fixed session identifier is maintained throughout a session. A		A fixed session identifier is maintained throughout a session. A
session cannot be shared across multiple network interfaces. Only		session cannot be shared across multiple network interfaces.
one device identifier of the PaC is allowed to be bound to a PANA
session for simplicity.
Session Lifetime:		Session Lifetime:
A duration that is associated with a PANA session. For an		A duration that is associated with a PANA session. For an
established PANA session, the session lifetime is bound to the		established PANA session, the session lifetime is bound to the
lifetime of the current authorization given to the PaC. The		lifetime of the current authorization given to the PaC. The
session lifetime can be updated by a new round of EAP		session lifetime can be updated by a new round of EAP
authentication before it expires.		authentication before it expires.
Session Identifier:		Session Identifier:
This identifier is used to uniquely identify a PANA session on the		This identifier is used to uniquely identify a PANA session on the
PAA and PaC. It includes an identifier of the PAA, therefore it		PaC and the PAA. It is included in PANA messages to bind the
cannot be shared across multiple PAAs. It is included in PANA		message to a specific PANA session. This bidirectional identifier
messages to bind the message to a specific PANA session. This		is allocated by the PAA in handshake phase and freed when the
bidirectional identifier is allocated by the PAA following the		session terminates. The session identifier is assigned by the PAA
handshake and freed when the session terminates.		and unique within the PAA during the lifetime of the session.
PANA Security Association (PANA SA):		PANA Security Association (PANA SA):
A PANA security association is formed between the PaC and the PAA		A PANA security association is formed between the PaC and the PAA
by sharing cryptographic keying material and associated context.		by sharing cryptographic keying material and associated context.
The formed duplex security association is used to protect the		The formed duplex security association is used to protect the
bidirectional PANA signaling traffic between the PaC and the PAA.		bidirectional PANA signaling traffic between the PaC and PAA.
Device Identifier (DI):
The identifier used by the network as a handle to control and
police the network access of a device. Depending on the access
technology, this identifier may contain an address that is carried
in protocol headers (e.g., IP or link-layer address), or a locally
significant identifier that is made available by the local
protocol stack (e.g., circuit id, PPP interface id) of a connected
device.
Enforcement Point (EP):		Enforcement Point (EP):
A node on the access network where per-packet enforcement policies		A node on the access network where per-packet enforcement policies
(i.e., filters) are applied on the inbound and outbound traffic of		(i.e., filters) are applied on the inbound and outbound traffic of
access devices. Information such as the DI and (optionally)		access devices. The EP and the PAA may be co-located. EPs should
cryptographic keys are provided by the PAA per client for		prevent data traffic from and to any unauthorized client unless
generating filters on the EP. The EP and PAA may be co-located.		it's either PANA or one of the other allowed traffic types (e.g.,
		ARP, IPv6 neighbor discovery, DHCP, etc.). Detailed enforcement
Network Access Provider (NAP):		policies may be specified in deployment-specific PANA
		applicability documents.
A service provider that provides physical and link-layer
connectivity to an access network it manages.
AAA-Key:		Master Session Key (MSK):
A key derived by the EAP peer and EAP server and transported to		A key derived by the EAP peer and the EAP server and transported
the authenticator [I-D.ietf-eap-keying].		to the EAP authenticator [RFC3748].
For additional terminology definitions see the PANA framework		For additional terminology definitions see the PANA framework
document [I-D.ietf-pana-framework].		document [I-D.ietf-pana-framework].
3. Protocol Overview		3. Protocol Overview
The PANA protocol is run between a client (PaC) and a server (PAA) in		The PANA protocol is run between a client (PaC) and a server (PAA) in
order to perform authentication and authorization for the network		order to perform authentication and authorization for the network
access service.		access service.
Skipping to change at page 8, line 23:
zero or more AVPs within the payload. The main payload of PANA is		zero or more AVPs within the payload. The main payload of PANA is
EAP which performs authentication. PANA helps the PaC and PAA		EAP which performs authentication. PANA helps the PaC and PAA
establish an EAP session.		establish an EAP session.
PANA is a UDP-based protocol. It has its own retransmission		PANA is a UDP-based protocol. It has its own retransmission
mechanism to reliably deliver messages.		mechanism to reliably deliver messages.
PANA messages are sent between the PaC and PAA as part of a PANA		PANA messages are sent between the PaC and PAA as part of a PANA
session. A PANA session consists of distinct phases:		session. A PANA session consists of distinct phases:
o Discovery and handshake phase: This is the phase that initiates a		o Handshake phase: This is the phase that initiates a new PANA
new PANA session. The PaC discovers the PAA(s) by either		session. The handshake phase can be triggered by both the PaC and
explicitly soliciting advertisements for them or receiving		the PAA.
unsolicited advertisements. The PaC's answer sent in response to
an advertisement starts a new session.
o Authentication and authorization phase: Immediately following the		o Authentication and authorization phase: Immediately following the
discovery and handshake phase is the EAP execution between the PAA		handshake phase is the EAP execution between the PAA and PaC. The
and PaC. The EAP payload (which carry an EAP method inside) is		EAP payload (which carry an EAP method inside) is what is used for
what is used for authentication. The PAA conveys the result of		authentication. The PAA conveys the result of authentication and
authentication and authorization to the PaC at the end of this		authorization to the PaC at the end of this phase.
phase. This phase may involve execution of two EAP sessions back-
to-back, one for the NAP and one for the ISP.
o Access phase: After a successful authentication and authorization		o Access phase: After a successful authentication and authorization
the host gains access to the network and can send and receive IP		the host gains access to the network and can send and receive IP
data traffic through the EP(s). At any time during this phase,		data traffic through the EP(s). At any time during this phase,
the PaC and PAA may optionally send PANA ping messages to test		the PaC and PAA may optionally send PANA ping messages to test
liveness of the PANA session on the peer.		liveness of the PANA session on the peer.
o Re-authentication phase: During the access phase, the PAA must		o Re-authentication phase: During the access phase, the PAA must
initiate re-authentication before the PANA session lifetime		initiate re-authentication before the PANA session lifetime
expires. EAP is carried by PANA to perform authentication. This		expires. EAP is carried by PANA to perform authentication. This
Skipping to change at page 9, line 11:
o Termination phase: The PaC or PAA may choose to discontinue the		o Termination phase: The PaC or PAA may choose to discontinue the
access service at any time. An explicit disconnect message can be		access service at any time. An explicit disconnect message can be
sent by either end. If either the PaC or the PAA disconnects		sent by either end. If either the PaC or the PAA disconnects
without engaging in termination messaging, it is expected that		without engaging in termination messaging, it is expected that
either the expiration of a finite session lifetime or failed		either the expiration of a finite session lifetime or failed
liveness tests would clean up the session at the other end.		liveness tests would clean up the session at the other end.
PaC PAA Message		PaC PAA Message
-----------------------------------------------------		-----------------------------------------------------
// Discovery and handshake phase		// Handshake phase
-----> PANA-PAA-Discover		-----> PANA-Client-Initiation
<----- PANA-Start-Request		<----- PANA-Start-Request
-----> PANA-Start-Answer		-----> PANA-Start-Answer
// Authentication and authorization phase		// Authentication and authorization phase
<----- PANA-Auth-Request /* EAP Request */		<----- PANA-Auth-Request /* EAP Request */
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer		-----> PANA-Auth-Answer
-----> PANA-Auth-Request /* EAP Response */		-----> PANA-Auth-Request /* EAP Response */
<----- PANA-Auth-Answer		<----- PANA-Auth-Answer
<----- PANA-Bind-Request /* EAP Success */		<----- PANA-Bind-Request /* EAP Success */
-----> PANA-Bind-Answer		-----> PANA-Bind-Answer
Skipping to change at page 9, line 35:
<----- PANA-Ping-Request		<----- PANA-Ping-Request
-----> PANA-Ping-Answer		-----> PANA-Ping-Answer
// Termination phase		// Termination phase
-----> PANA-Termination-Request		-----> PANA-Termination-Request
<----- PANA-Termination-Answer		<----- PANA-Termination-Answer
Figure 1: Illustration of PANA messages in a session		Figure 1: Illustration of PANA messages in a session
Note that depending on the environment and deployment the protocol		Note that depending on the environment and deployment the protocol
flow depicted in Figure 1 can be abbreviated (An unsolicited PANA-		flow depicted in Figure 1 can be abbreviated (An unsolicited
Start-Request can be sent without a triggering PANA-PAA-Discover, EAP		PANA-Start-Request message can be sent without
responses can be piggybacked on the PANA-Auth-Answers, and PANA-Ping		PANA-Client-Initiation, EAP responses can be piggybacked on the
and PANA-Termination usage is optional).		PANA-Auth-Answers, and PANA-Ping and PANA-Termination usage is
		optional).
Cryptographic protection of messages between the PaC and PAA is		Cryptographic protection of messages between the PaC and PAA is
possible as soon as EAP in conjunction with the EAP method exports a		possible as soon as EAP in conjunction with the EAP method exports a
shared key. That shared key is used to create a PANA SA. The PANA		shared key. That shared key is used to create a PANA SA. The PANA
SA helps generate per-message authentication codes that provide		SA helps generate per-message authentication codes that provide
integrity protection and authentication.		integrity protection and authentication.
Throughout the lifetime of a session, various problems found with the		Throughout the lifetime of a session, various problems found with the
incoming messages can generate a PANA error message sent in response.		incoming messages can generate a PANA error message sent in response.
4. Protocol Details		4. Protocol Details
The following sections explain in detail the various phases of a PANA		The following sections explain in detail the various phases of a PANA
session.		session.
4.1. Transport Layer		4.1. Transport Layer
PANA uses UDP as its transport layer protocol. The UDP port number		PANA uses UDP as its transport layer protocol. The UDP port number
is To Be Assigned by IANA. All messages except for PANA-PAA-Discover		is To Be Assigned by IANA. All messages are always unicast.
are always unicast. The PANA-PAA-Discover message MAY be unicast
when the PaC knows the IP address of the PAA.
4.2. Payload Encoding		4.2. High-Level Attribute-Value Pair Description
The payload of any PANA message consists of zero or more AVPs		The payload of any PANA message consists of zero or more AVPs
(Attribute Value Pairs). The subsequent sections refer to these		(Attribute Value Pairs). The subsequent sections refer to these
AVPs, therefore the list of AVPs are provided with a brief		AVPs, therefore the list of AVPs are provided with a brief
description before more extensive descriptions are included later in		description before more extensive descriptions are included later in
the document (see Section 8).		the document (see Section 8).
o Algorithm AVP: contains a pseudo-random function and an integrity		o Algorithm AVP: contains a pseudo-random function and an integrity
algorithm.		algorithm.
o AUTH AVP: contains a Message Authentication Code that integrity		o AUTH AVP: contains a Message Authentication Code that integrity
protects the PANA message.		protects the PANA message.
o Cookie AVP: contains a random value that is generated by the PAA
according to [RFC4086] and used for making PAA discovery robust
against blind resource consumption DoS attacks.
o Device-Id AVP: contains a device identifier (link-layer address or
an IP address) of the PaC or an EP.
o EAP AVP: contains an EAP PDU.		o EAP AVP: contains an EAP PDU.
o Failed-AVP: contains an offending AVP that caused a failure.		o Failed-AVP: contains an offending AVP that caused a failure.
o Key-Id AVP: contains a AAA-Key identifier.		o Failed-Message-Header AVP: contains the header of an offending
		message that caused a failure.
o Protection-Capability AVP: contains the type of per-packet
protection (link-layer vs. network-layer) when a cryptographic
mechanism should be enabled after PANA authentication.
o NAP-Information AVP, ISP-Information AVP: contains the identifier		o Key-Id AVP: contains an MSK identifier.
of a NAP and an ISP, respectively.
o Nonce AVP: contains a randomly chosen value [RFC4086] that is used		o Nonce AVP: contains a randomly chosen value [RFC4086] that is used
in cryptographic key computations.		in cryptographic key computations.
o Notification AVP: contains a displayable message.
o Provider-Identifier AVP: contains the identifier of a NAP or an
ISP.
o PPAC AVP: Post-PANA-Address-Configuration AVP. Used to indicate
the available/chosen IP address configuration methods that can be
used by the PaC after successful PANA authentication.
o Provider-Name AVP: contains a name of a NAP or an ISP.
o Result-Code AVP: contains information about the protocol execution		o Result-Code AVP: contains information about the protocol execution
results.		results.
o Session-Id AVP: contains the PANA session identifier value.
o Session-Lifetime AVP: contains the duration of authorized access.		o Session-Lifetime AVP: contains the duration of authorized access.
o Termination-Cause AVP: contains the reason of session termination.		o Termination-Cause AVP: contains the reason of session termination.
4.3. Discovery and Handshake Phase		4.3. Handshake Phase
When the PaC knows the IP address of the PAA, it can send a unicast
PANA-PAA-Discover message and initiate the PANA exchange. In other
cases, the PaC MUST rely on dynamic discovery methods, such as
multicast-based and a traffic-driven discovery.
Multicast-based Discovery:
The PaCs and PAAs MUST implement multicast-based discovery where
the PaC sends a PANA-PAA-Discover message to a well-known
administratively scoped multicast address (To Be Assigned by IANA)
and UDP port (To Be Assigned by IANA).
The network administrator MUST configure the multicast scope such
that the discovery messages can reach only the designated PAA(s).
In case the PAA(s) is on the same link as the PaC, the
administratively scoped multicast messages MUST not be forwarded
by the routers. Details of scope configuration are discussed in
[RFC2365].
The PAA(s) that receive the discovery message MUST respond with a		The handshake phase can be initiated by either the PaC or the PAA.
unicast PANA-Start-Request message sent to the soliciting PaC.
Traffic-driven Discovery:		PaC-initiated Handshake:
Alternatively, the PaC MAY also choose to start sending data		When the PaC initiates the handshake phase, it sends a
packets before getting authenticated. The EP in an access network		PANA-Client-Initiation message to the PAA. When the PaC is not
that implements PANA SHOULD drop such unauthorized packets upon		configured with an IP address of the PAA before initiating the
receipt. Additionally, the EP MAY also take this traffic as an		handshake phase, DHCP [I-D.ietf-dhc-paa-option] is used as the
indication of unauthorized PaC and notify the PAA. The EP-to-PAA		default method for dynamically configuring the IP address of the
notification SHOULD be sent via [I-D.ietf-pana-snmp]. In		PAA. Alternative methods for dynamically discovering the IP
response, the PAA SHOULD send an unsolicited PANA-Start-Request		address of the PAA may be used for PaC-initiated handshake but
message to the PaC. This is called traffic-driven PAA discovery		they are outside the scope of this specification. The PAA that
(an alternative to the PaC explicitly soliciting for a PAA).		receives the PANA-Client-Initiation message MUST respond with a
Deployment of this alternate scheme is optional.		PANA-Start-Request message sent to the PaC.
Other Alternatives:		PAA-initiated Handshake:
The EP-to-PAA notification MAY also be generated in response to		When the PAA knows the IP address of the PaC, it MAY send an
receiving a link-up event notification on the EP [I-D.ietf-dna-		unsolicited PANA-Start-Request to the PaC. The details of how PAA
link-information].		can learn the IP address of the PaC are outside the scope of this
		specification.
Alternative PAA discovery schemes may be designed (e.g., DHCP-		A session identifier for the session is assigned by the PAA in the
based) but they are outside the scope of this specification.		handshake phase and carried in the PANA-Start-Request message. The
		same session identifier MUST be carried in the subsequent messages
		exchanged between the PAA and PaC throughout the session.
When the PaC receives a PANA-Start-Request message from a PAA, it		When the PaC receives a PANA-Start-Request message from a PAA, it
responds with a PANA-Start-Answer message if it wishes to enter the		responds with a PANA-Start-Answer message if it wishes to enter the
authentication and authorization phase.		authentication and authorization phase.
There can be multiple PAAs in the access network and the PaC may		The PAA MAY limit the rate it processes incoming
receive multiple PANA-Start-Request messages from those PAAs. The		PANA-Client-Initiation messages.
authentication and authorization result does not depend on which PAA
is chosen by the PaC. By default the PaC MAY choose the PAA that
sent the first PANA-Start-Request message.
A PANA-Start-Request message MAY carry a Cookie AVP that contains a
random value generated by the PAA. The random value is referred to
as a cookie. The cookie is used for preventing the PAA from resource
consumption DoS attacks by blind attackers which bombard the PAA with
PANA-PAA-Discover messages. By relying on a cookie mechanism the PAA
can avoid per-PaC state creation until after the PaC can produce the
same cookie in its PANA-Start-Answer message. In order to do that,
the cookie MUST be computed in such a way that it does not require
any per-session state maintenance on the PAA in order to verify the
cookie returned in the PANA-Start-Answer message. The PAA discovery
that takes advantage of cookies is called "stateless PAA discovery".
The exact algorithms and syntax used by the PAA to generate cookies
does not affect interoperability and hence is not specified here.
Additionally, the PAA MAY limit the rate it processes incoming PANA-
PAA-Discover messages.
When the PaC sends a PANA-Start-Answer message in response to a PANA-
Start-Request containing a Cookie AVP, the answer MUST contain a
Cookie AVP with the cookie value copied from the request.
When the PAA receives the PANA-Start-Answer message from the PaC, it
verifies the cookie. The cookie is considered as valid if the
received cookie matches the send cookie. If the match is verified,
the protocol enters the authentication and authorization phase.
Otherwise, the PAA MUST silently discard the received message.
The initial EAP Request message MAY be optionally carried by the
PANA-Start-Request (as opposed to by a later PANA-Auth-Request)
message in order to reduce the number of round-trips. This
optimization SHOULD NOT be used if the PAA discovery is desired to be
stateless since transmission of an EAP Request message creates a
state at EAP layer. See [RFC4137] for more information on the EAP
state machine and the allocation of state information in the
respective protocol steps.
A Protection-Capability AVP, an Algorithm AVP and a Post-PANA-
Address-Configuration (PPAC) AVP MAY be included in the PANA-Start-
Request in order to indicate required and available capabilities for
the network access. These AVPs MAY be used by the PaC for assessing
the capability match even before the authentication takes place.
Since these AVPs are provided during the insecure discovery and
handshake phase, there are certain security risks involved in using
the provided information. See Section 11 for further discussion on
this.
If the initial EAP Request message is carried in the PANA-Start-
Request message, an EAP Response message MUST be carried in the PANA-
Start-Answer message returned to the PAA.
The PANA-Start-Request/Answer exchange is needed before entering the		An Algorithm AVP MAY be included in the PANA-Start-Request in order
authentication and authorization phase even when the PaC is pre-		to indicate required and available capabilities for the network
configured with the IP address of the PAA and the PANA-PAA-Discover		access. This AVP MAY be used by the PaC for assessing the capability
message is unicast.		match even before the authentication takes place. Since this AVP is
		provided during the insecure handshake phase, there are certain
		security risks involved in using the provided information. See
		Section 11 for further discussion on this.
A Nonce AVP MUST be included in the first PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-		The initial EAP Request message MAY be carried by the
Auth-Answer messages in the authentication and authorization phase		PANA-Start-Request message (as oppose to by a later PANA-Auth-Request
when stateless PAA discovery is used, and in PANA-Start-Request and		message) in order to reduce the number of round-trips. If the
PANA-Start-Answer messages in this phase otherwise.		initial EAP Request message is carried in the PANA-Start-Request
		message, an EAP Response message MUST be carried in the
		PANA-Start-Answer message returned to the PAA.
A PANA-Start-Request message in stateless PAA discovery MUST NOT be		In order to prevent potential DoS attacks, the PAA MAY refrain from
retransmitted as this voids the statelessness on the PAA. Instead,		timeout-based retransmission of the PANA-Start-Request message in
the PaC MUST retransmit the PANA-PAA-Discover message until it		response to a PaC-initiated handshake. For this reason, the PaC MUST
receives a PANA-Start-Request message, and retransmit the PANA-Start-		retransmit the PANA-Client-Initiation message until it enters the
Answer message until it receives a PANA-Auth-Request message. The		authentication and authorization phase by receiving the first
PaC can determine whether the PAA is using stateless PAA discovery by		PANA-Auth-Request message from the PAA.
looking at the L-flag in the PANA header. The PANA-Start-Request
message MUST be retransmitted instead of the PANA-Start-Answer
message when stateful PAA discovery is used (L-flag is not set).
It is possible that both the PAA and the PaC initiate the discovery		It is possible that both the PAA and the PaC initiate the handshake
and handshake procedure at the same time, i.e., the PAA sends a PANA-		procedure at the same time, i.e., the PAA sends a PANA-Start-Request
Start-Request message while the PaC sends a PANA-PAA-Discover		message while the PaC sends a PANA-Client-Initiation message. To
message. To resolve the race condition, the PAA SHOULD silently		resolve the race condition, the PAA SHOULD silently discard the
discard the PANA-PAA-Discover message received from the PaC after it		PANA-Client-Initiation message received from the PaC after it has
has sent a PANA-Start-Request message with creating a state (i.e.,		sent a PANA-Start-Request message.
L-flag is not set) for the PaC. In this case the PAA will retransmit
the PANA-Start-Request message based on a timer, if the PaC doesn't
respond in time (the message was lost for example). If the PAA had
sent a PANA-Start-Request message without creating a state for the
PaC (i.e., L-flag is set), then it SHOULD answer to the PANA-PAA-
Discover message.
Figure 2 shows an example sequence for the discovery and handshake		Figure 2 shows an example sequence for PaC-initiated handshake.
phase when a PANA-PAA-Discover message is sent by the PaC. Figure 3
shows an example sequence for the discovery and handshake phase with
traffic-driven PAA discovery.
PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs]		PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs]
------------------------------------------------------		------------------------------------------------------
-----> PANA-PAA-Discover(0)		-----> PANA-Client-Initiation(0)
<----- PANA-Start-Request(x)[Cookie]		<----- PANA-Start-Request(x)
-----> PANA-Start-Answer(x)[Cookie]		-----> PANA-Start-Answer(x)
(continued to the authentication and
authorization phase)
Figure 2: Example sequence for the discovery and handshake phase when
PANA-PAA-Discover is sent by the PaC
PaC EP PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs]
------------------------------------------------------
---->o (Data packet arrival or L2 trigger)
------> PAA-to-EP protocol, or another mechanism
<------------ PANA-Start-Request(x)[Cookie]
------------> PANA-Start-Answer(x)[Cookie]
(continued to the authentication and		(continued to the authentication and
authorization phase)		authorization phase)
Figure 3: Example sequence for the discovery and handshake phase with		Figure 2: Example sequence for PaC-initiated handshake phase
traffic-driven PAA discovery
4.4. Authentication and Authorization Phase		4.4. Authentication and Authorization Phase
The main task of the authentication and authorization phase is to		The main task of the authentication and authorization phase is to
carry EAP messages between the PaC and the PAA. EAP Request and		carry EAP messages between the PaC and the PAA. EAP Request and
Response messages are carried in PANA-Auth-Request messages. PANA-		Response messages are carried in PANA-Auth-Request messages.
Auth-Answer messages are simply used to acknowledge receipt of the		PANA-Auth-Answer messages are simply used to acknowledge receipt of
requests. As an optimization, a PANA-Auth-Answer message MAY include		the requests. As an optimization, a PANA-Auth-Answer message MAY
the EAP Response message. This optimization MAY not be used when it		include the EAP Response message. This optimization MAY not be used
takes time to generate the EAP Response message (due to, e.g.,		when it takes time to generate the EAP Response message (due to,
intervention of human input), in which case returning an EAP-Auth-		e.g., intervention of human input), in which case returning an
Answer message without piggybacking an EAP Response message can avoid		PANA-Auth-Answer message without piggybacking an EAP Response message
unnecessary retransmission of the PANA-Auth-Request message. Another		can avoid unnecessary retransmission of the PANA-Auth-Request
optimization allows optionally carrying the first EAP Request/		message. Another optimization allows optionally carrying the first
Response message in PANA-Start-Request/Answer message as described in		EAP Request/Response message in PANA-Start-Request/Answer message as
Section 4.3.		described in Section 4.3.
When stateless PAA discovery was performed in the discovery and
handshake phase, a Nonce AVP MUST be included in the first PANA-Auth-
Request and PANA-Auth-Answer messages.
PANA allows execution of two separate authentication methods, one		A Nonce AVP MUST be included in the first PANA-Auth-Request and
with NAP and one with ISP under the same PANA session. This optional		PANA-Auth-Answer messages.
feature may be offered by the PAA and accepted by the PaC. When
performed separately, the result of the first EAP authentication is
signaled via PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request and PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer
message exchange which delineates the first method execution from the
next. See Section 4.8 for a detailed discussion on separate NAP and
ISP authentication.
The result of PANA authentication is carried in a PANA-Bind-Request		The result of PANA authentication is carried in a PANA-Bind-Request
message sent from the PAA to the PaC. This message carries the final		message sent from the PAA to the PaC. This message carries the EAP
EAP authentication result (whether it is the second EAP		authentication result and the result of PANA authentication. The
authentication result of NAP and ISP separate authentication, or the		PANA-Bind-Request message MUST be acknowledged with a
sole EAP authentication result) and the result of PANA		PANA-Bind-Answer (PBA) message. Figure 3 shows an example sequence
authentication. The PANA-Bind-Request message MUST be acknowledged		in the authentication and authorization phase.
with a PANA-Bind-Answer (PBA) message. Figure 4 shows an example
sequence in the authentication and authorization phase (no separate
authentication).
PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs]		PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs]
--------------------------------------------------------------------		--------------------------------------------------------------------
(continued from the discovery and handshake phase)		(continued from the handshake phase)
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+1)		<----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+1)[Nonce, EAP{Request}]
[Session-Id, Nonce, EAP{Request}]		-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+1)[Nonce] // No piggybacking EAP Resp.
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+1) // No piggybacking EAP Response		-----> PANA-Auth-Request(y)[EAP{Response}]
[Session-Id, Nonce]
-----> PANA-Auth-Request(y)
[Session-Id, EAP{Response}]
<----- PANA-Auth-Answer(y)		<----- PANA-Auth-Answer(y)
[Session-Id]		<----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+2)[EAP{Request}]
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+2)		-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+2)[EAP{Response}]
[Session-Id, EAP{Request}]		<----- PANA-Bind-Request(x+3)[Result-Code, EAP{Success}, Key-Id,
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+2) // Piggybacking EAP Response		Algorithm, Lifetime, AUTH]
[Session-Id, EAP{Response}]		-----> PANA-Bind-Answer(x+3)[Key-Id, AUTH]
<----- PANA-Bind-Request(x+3)
[Session-Id, Result-Code, EAP{Success}, Device-Id,
Key-Id, Algorithm,
Lifetime, Protection-Cap., PPAC, AUTH]
-----> PANA-Bind-Answer(x+3)
[Session-Id, Device-Id, Key-Id, PPAC, AUTH]
Figure 4: Example sequence for the authentication and authorization		Figure 3: Example sequence for the authentication and authorization
phase		phase
When an EAP method that is capable of deriving keys is used during		When an EAP method that is capable of deriving keys is used during
the authentication and authorization phase and the keys are		the authentication and authorization phase and the keys are
successfully derived, the PANA message that carries the EAP Success		successfully derived, the PANA message that carries the EAP Success
message (i.e., a PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request or a PANA-Bind-Request		message (i.e., a PANA-Bind-Request message) MUST contain a Key-Id AVP
message) MUST contain a Key-Id AVP and an AUTH AVP, and an Algorithm		and an AUTH AVP, and an Algorithm AVP for the first derivation of
AVP for the first derivation of keys in the session, and any		keys in the session, and any subsequent message MUST contain an AUTH
subsequent message MUST contain an AUTH AVP. An Algorithm AVP MUST		AVP. An Algorithm AVP MUST NOT be contained in a PANA-Bind-Request
NOT be contained in a PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request or a PANA-Bind-		message after the first derivation of keys in the session.
Request message after the first derivation of keys in the session.
The PANA-Bind-Request and the PANA-Bind-Answer message exchange is
also used for binding device identifiers of the PaC and EP(s) to the
PANA SA. To achieve this, if a Protection-Capability AVP is included
in the PANA-Bind-Request message, the message MUST contain the device
identifier in a Device-Id AVP for each EP. Otherwise, if a
Protection-Capability AVP is not included in the PANA-Bind-Request
message, the message MUST contain the device identifier in a
Device-Id AVP for each EP when a link-layer or IP address is used as
the device identifier of the PaC. The PANA-Bind-Answer message MUST
contain the PaC's device identifier in a Device-Id AVP when it is
already presented with that of EP(s) in the request with using the
same type of device identifier as contained in the request. If the
PANA-Bind-Answer message sent from the PaC does not contain a
Device-Id AVP with the same device identifier type contained in the
request, the PAA sends a PANA-Error-Request message with a
PANA_MISSING_AVP result code, and wait for a PANA-Error-Answer
message to terminate the session.
The PANA-Bind-Request message with a PANA_SUCCESS result code MUST
also contain a Protection-Capability AVP if link-layer or network-
layer ciphering is enabled after the authentication and authorization
phase. The PANA-Bind-Request message MAY also contain a Protection-
Capability AVP to indicate if link-layer or network-layer ciphering
should be enabled after the authentication and authorization phase.
No link-layer or network-layer specific information is included in
the Protection-Capability AVP. It is assumed that the PAA is aware
of the security capabilities of the access network. The PANA
protocol does not specify how the PANA SA and the Protection-
Capability AVP will be used to provide per-packet protection for data
traffic. When the PaC does not support the protection capability
indicated in the Protection-Capability AVP, the PaC MUST send a PANA-
Error-Request message with a PANA_PROTECTION_CAPABILITY_UNSUPPORTED
result code and terminate the PANA session.
Additionally, the PANA-Bind-Request message with a PANA_SUCCESS
result code MUST include a Post-PANA-Address-Configuration (PPAC)
AVP, which helps the PAA to inform the PaC about whether a new IP
address MUST be configured and the available methods to do so. In
this case, the PaC MUST include a PPAC AVP in the PANA-Bind-Answer
message in order to indicate its choice of method when there is a
match between the methods offered by the PAA and the methods
available on the PaC. When there is no match, the PaC MUST send a
PANA-Error-Request message with a PANA_PPAC_CAPABILITY_UNSUPPORTED
result code and terminate the PANA session.
EAP authentication can fail at a pass-through authenticator without		EAP authentication can fail at a pass-through authenticator without
sending an EAP Failure message [RFC4137]. When this occurs, the PAA		sending an EAP Failure message [RFC4137]. When this occurs, the PAA
SHOULD send a PANA-Error-Request message to the PaC with using		SHOULD send a PANA-Error-Request message to the PaC with using
PANA_UNABLE_TO_COMPLY result code. The PaC MUST NOT change its state		PANA_UNABLE_TO_COMPLY result code. The PaC MUST NOT change its state
unless the error message is secured by PANA or lower-layer. In any		unless the error message is secured by PANA or lower-layer. In any
case, a more appropriate way is to rely on a timeout on the PaC.		case, a more appropriate way is to rely on a timeout on the PaC.
There is a case where EAP authentication succeeds with producing an		There is a case where EAP authentication succeeds with producing an
EAP Success message but network access authorization fails due to,		EAP Success message but network access authorization fails due to,
e.g., authorization rejected by a AAA or authorization locally		e.g., authorization rejected by a AAA or authorization locally
rejected by the PAA. When this occurs, the PAA MUST send a PANA-		rejected by the PAA. When this occurs, the PAA MUST send a
Bind-Request with a result code PANA_AUTHORIZATION_REJECTED. If a		PANA-Bind-Request with a result code PANA_AUTHORIZATION_REJECTED. If
AAA-Key is established between the PaC and the PAA by the time when		an MSK is established between the PaC and the PAA by the time when
the EAP Success message is generated by the EAP server (this is the		the EAP Success message is generated by the EAP server (this is the
case when the EAP method provides protected success indication), the		case when the EAP method provides protected success indication), the
PANA-Bind-Request and PANA-Bind-Answer messages MUST be protected		PANA-Bind-Request and PANA-Bind-Answer messages MUST be protected
with an AUTH AVP and carry a Key-Id AVP. The PANA-Bind-Request		with an AUTH AVP and carry a Key-Id AVP. The PANA-Bind-Request
message MUST also carry an Algorithm AVP if it is for the first		message MUST also carry an Algorithm AVP if it is for the first
derivation of keys in the session. The AAA-Key and the PANA session		derivation of keys in the session. The MSK and the PANA session MUST
MUST be deleted immediately after the PANA-Bind message exchange.		be deleted immediately after the PANA-Bind message exchange.
4.5. Access Phase		4.5. Access Phase
Once the authentication and authorization phase or the re-		Once the authentication and authorization phase or the
authentication phase successfully completes, the PaC gains access to		re-authentication phase successfully completes, the PaC gains access
the network and can send and receive IP data traffic through the		to the network and can send and receive IP data traffic through the
EP(s) and the PANA session enters the access phase. In this phase,		EP(s) and the PANA session enters the access phase. In this phase,
PANA-Ping-Request and PANA-Ping-Answer messages can be used for		PANA-Ping-Request and PANA-Ping-Answer messages can be used for
testing the liveness of the PANA session on the PANA peer. Both the		testing the liveness of the PANA session on the PANA peer. Both the
PaC and the PAA are allowed to send a PANA-Ping-Request message to		PaC and the PAA are allowed to send a PANA-Ping-Request message to
the communicating peer whenever they need to make sure the		the communicating peer whenever they need to make sure the
availability of the session on the peer and expect the peer to return		availability of the session on the peer and expect the peer to return
a PANA-Ping-Answer message. Both PANA-Ping-Request and PANA-Ping-		a PANA-Ping-Answer message. Both PANA-Ping-Request and
Answer messages MUST be protected with an AUTH AVP when a PANA SA is		PANA-Ping-Answer messages MUST be protected with an AUTH AVP when a
available.		PANA SA is available.
Implementations MUST limit the rate of performing this test. The PaC		Implementations MUST limit the rate of performing this test. The PaC
and the PAA can handle rate limitation on their own, they do not have		and the PAA can handle rate limitation on their own, they do not have
to perform any coordination with each other. There is no negotiation		to perform any coordination with each other. There is no negotiation
of timers for this purpose. Additionally, an implementation MAY		of timers for this purpose. Additionally, an implementation MAY
rate-limit processing the incoming PANA-Ping-Requests.		rate-limit processing the incoming PANA-Ping-Requests.
Figure 5 and Figure 6 show liveness tests as they are initiated by		Figure 4 and Figure 5 show liveness tests as they are initiated by
the PaC and the PAA respectively.		the PaC and the PAA respectively.
PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs]		PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs]
------------------------------------------------------		------------------------------------------------------
-----> PANA-Ping-Request(q)[Session-Id, AUTH]		-----> PANA-Ping-Request(q)[AUTH]
<----- PANA-Ping-Answer(q)[Session-Id, AUTH]		<----- PANA-Ping-Answer(q)[AUTH]
Figure 5: Example sequence for PaC-initiated liveness test		Figure 4: Example sequence for PaC-initiated liveness test
PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs]		PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs]
------------------------------------------------------		------------------------------------------------------
<----- PANA-Ping-Request(p)[Session-Id, AUTH]		<----- PANA-Ping-Request(p)[AUTH]
-----> PANA-Ping-Answer(p)[Session-Id, AUTH]		-----> PANA-Ping-Answer(p)[AUTH]
Figure 6: Example sequence for PAA-initiated liveness test		Figure 5: Example sequence for PAA-initiated liveness test
4.6. Re-authentication Phase		4.6. Re-authentication Phase
The PANA session in the access phase can enter the re-authentication		The PANA session in the access phase can enter the re-authentication
phase to extend the current session lifetime by re-executing EAP.		phase to extend the current session lifetime by re-executing EAP.
Once the re-authentication phase successfully completes, the session		Once the re-authentication phase successfully completes, the session
re-enters the access phase. Otherwise, the session is deleted.		re-enters the access phase. Otherwise, the session is deleted.
When the PaC wants to initiate re-authentication, it sends a PANA-		When the PaC wants to initiate re-authentication, it sends a
Reauth-Request message to the PAA. This message MUST contain a		PANA-Reauth-Request message to the PAA. This message MUST contain
Session-Id AVP which is used for identifying the PANA session on the		the session identifier assigned to the session being
PAA. If the PAA already has an established PANA session for the PaC		re-authenticated. If the PAA already has an established PANA session
with the matching session identifier, it MUST first respond with a		for the PaC with the matching session identifier, it MUST first
PANA-Reauth-Answer message, followed by a PANA-Auth-Request that		respond with a PANA-Reauth-Answer message, followed by a
starts a new EAP authentication. If the PAA cannot identify the		PANA-Auth-Request message that starts a new EAP authentication. If
session, it MAY respond with a PANA-Error-Request message with a		the PAA cannot identify the session, it MUST silently discard the
result code PANA_UNKNOWN_SESSION_ID. Transmission of this error		message. A Nonce AVP MUST be included in the first PANA-Auth-Request
request is made optional in case this behavior is leveraged for a DoS		and PANA-Auth-Answer messages in the re-authentication phase.
attack on the PAA.
The PaC may receive a PANA-Auth-Request before receiving the answer		The PaC may receive a PANA-Auth-Request before receiving the answer
to its outstanding PANA-Reauth-Request. This condition can arise due		to its outstanding PANA-Reauth-Request. This condition can arise due
to packet re-ordering or a race condition between the PaC and PAA		to packet re-ordering or a race condition between the PaC and PAA
when they both attempt to engage in re-authentication. The PaC MUST		when they both attempt to engage in re-authentication. The PaC MUST
keep discarding the received PANA-Auth-Requests until it receives the		keep discarding the received PANA-Auth-Requests until it receives the
answer to its request.		answer to its request.
When the PAA initiates re-authentication, it sends a PANA-Auth-		When the PAA initiates re-authentication, it sends a
Request message containing the session identifier for the PaC to		PANA-Auth-Request message containing the session identifier for the
enter the re-authentication phase. The PAA SHOULD initiate EAP re-		PaC to enter the re-authentication phase. The PAA SHOULD initiate
authentication before the current session lifetime expires.		EAP re-authentication before the current session lifetime expires.
Re-authentication of an on-going PANA session MUST maintain the		Re-authentication of an on-going PANA session MUST maintain the
existing sequence numbers.		existing sequence numbers.
For any re-authentication, if there is an established PANA SA, PANA-		For any re-authentication, if there is an established PANA SA,
Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer messages MUST be protected by		PANA-Reauth-Request, PANA-Reauth-Answer, PANA-Auth-Request and
adding a MAC AVP to each message. Any subsequent EAP authentication		PANA-Auth-Answer messages MUST be protected by adding an AUTH AVP to
MUST be performed with the same ISP and NAP that was selected during		each message.
the discovery and handshake phase. The value of the S-flag
("separate authentication" flag, see Section 4.8.1) of the PANA
messages exchanged in the re-authentication phase MUST be inherited
from the previous authentication and authorization phase or re-
authentication phase.
PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs]		PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs]
------------------------------------------------------		------------------------------------------------------
-----> PANA-Reauth-Request(q)		-----> PANA-Reauth-Request(q)[AUTH]
[Session-Id, AUTH]		<----- PANA-Reauth-Answer(q)[AUTH]
<----- PANA-Reauth-Answer(q)		<----- PANA-Auth-Request(p)[EAP{Request}, AUTH]
[Session-Id, AUTH]		-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(p)[AUTH] // No piggybacking EAP Resp.
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(p)		-----> PANA-Auth-Request(q+1)[EAP{Response}, AUTH]
[Session-Id, EAP{Request}, AUTH]		<----- PANA-Auth-Answer(q+1)[AUTH] // No piggybacking EAP Resp.
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(p) // No piggybacking EAP Response		<----- PANA-Auth-Request(p+1)[EAP{Request}, AUTH]
[Session-Id, AUTH]		-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(p+1)[EAP{Response}, AUTH]
-----> PANA-Auth-Request(q+1)		<----- PANA-Bind-Request(p+2)[Result-Code, EAP{Success}, Key-Id,
[Session-Id, EAP{Response}, AUTH]		Algorithm, Lifetime, AUTH]
<----- PANA-Auth-Answer(q+1) // No piggybacking EAP Response		-----> PANA-Bind-Answer(p+2)[Key-Id, AUTH]
[Session-Id, AUTH]
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(p+1)
[Session-Id, EAP{Request}, AUTH]
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(p+1) // Piggybacking EAP Response
[Session-Id, EAP{Response}, AUTH]
<----- PANA-Bind-Request(p+2)
[Session-Id, Result-Code, EAP{Success},
Device-Id, Key-Id, Algorithm,
Lifetime, Protection-Cap., PPAC, AUTH]
-----> PANA-Bind-Answer(p+2)
[Session-Id, Device-Id, Key-Id, PPAC, AUTH]
Figure 7: Example sequence for the re-authentication phase initiated		Figure 6: Example sequence for the re-authentication phase initiated
by PaC		by PaC
4.7. Termination Phase		4.7. Termination Phase
A procedure for explicitly terminating a PANA session can be		A procedure for explicitly terminating a PANA session can be
initiated either from the PaC (i.e., disconnect indication) or from		initiated either from the PaC (i.e., disconnect indication) or from
the PAA (i.e., session revocation). The PANA-Termination-Request and		the PAA (i.e., session revocation). The PANA-Termination-Request and
PANA-Termination-Answer message exchanges are used for disconnect		PANA-Termination-Answer message exchanges are used for disconnect
indication and session revocation procedures.		indication and session revocation procedures.
The reason for termination is indicated in the Termination-Cause AVP.		The reason for termination is indicated in the Termination-Cause AVP.
When there is an established PANA SA between the PaC and the PAA, all		When there is an established PANA SA between the PaC and the PAA, all
messages exchanged during the termination phase MUST be protected		messages exchanged during the termination phase MUST be protected
with an AUTH AVP. When the sender of the PANA-Termination-Request		with an AUTH AVP. When the sender of the PANA-Termination-Request
message receives a valid acknowledgment, all states maintained for		message receives a valid acknowledgment, all states maintained for
the PANA session MUST be deleted immediately.		the PANA session MUST be deleted immediately.
PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs]		PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs]
------------------------------------------------------		------------------------------------------------------
-----> PANA-Termination-Request(q)[Session-Id, AUTH]		-----> PANA-Termination-Request(q)[AUTH]
<----- PANA-Termination-Answer(q)[Session-Id, AUTH]		<----- PANA-Termination-Answer(q)[AUTH]
Figure 8: Example sequence for the termination phase triggered by PaC
4.8. Separate NAP and ISP Authentication
PANA allows running at most two EAP sessions in sequence in the
authentication and authorization phase to support separate NAP and
ISP authentication as described in this section. A typical network
access authentication includes execution of one EAP method with the
ISP. This separation allows the PaC to perform an additional
authentication method for receiving differentiated services from the
NAP.
Currently, running multiple EAP sessions in sequence in the
authentication and authorization phase is designed only for separate
NAP and ISP authentication. It is not for running arbitrary number
of EAP sessions in sequence, or giving the PaC another chance to try
another EAP authentication method within an integrated NAP and ISP
authentication when an EAP authentication method fails.
Within separate NAP and ISP authentication, the NAP authentication
and the ISP authentication are considered completely independent.
Presence or success of one should not effect the other. Making a
network access authorization decision based on the success or failure
of each authentication is a network policy issue.
4.8.1. Negotiating Separate NAP and ISP Authentication
When the PaC and PAA negotiates in the discovery and handshake phase
to perform separate NAP and ISP authentication, the PaC and the PAA
operate in the following way in addition to the behavior defined in
Section 4.3
In the discovery and handshake phase, the PAA MAY advertise
availability of separate NAP and ISP authentication ([I-D.ietf-pana-
framework]) by setting the S-flag on the PANA header of the PANA-
Start-Request message.
If the S-flag of the received PANA-Start-Request message is set, the
PaC can indicate its desire to perform separate NAP and ISP
authentication by setting the S-flag in the PANA-Start-Answer
message. If the S-flag of the received PANA-Start-Request message is
not set, the PaC MUST NOT set the S-flag in the PANA-Start-Answer
message sent back to the PAA.
If the S-flag in the PANA-Start-Answer message is not set, only one
authentication is performed (ISP-only) and the processing occurs as
described in Section 4.3.
When the S-flag is set in a PANA-Start-Request message, the initial
EAP Request message MUST NOT be carried in the PANA-Start-Request
message. (If the initial EAP Request message were contained in the
PANA-Start-Request message during the S-flag negotiation, the PaC
cannot tell whether the EAP Request message is for NAP authentication
or ISP authentication.)
4.8.2. Execution of Separate NAP and ISP Authentication
When the PaC and PAA have negotiated in the discovery and handshake
phase to perform separate NAP and ISP authentication, the PaC and the
PAA operate in the following way in addition to the behavior defined
in Section 4.4
o The S-flag of PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer messages MUST
be set.
o An EAP Success/Failure message is carried in a PANA-FirstAuth-End-
Request (PFER) message as well as a PANA-Bind-Request (PBR)
message. The PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request message MUST be used at
the end of the first EAP authentication and the PANA-Bind-Request
MUST be used for the second EAP authentication. The PANA-
FirstAuth-End-Request messages MUST be acknowledged with a PANA-
FirstAuth-End-Answer (PFEA) message.
o If the first EAP authentication has failed, the PAA can choose not
to perform the second EAP authentication by clearing the S-flag of
the PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request message. In this case, the S-flag
of the PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer message sent by the PaC MUST be
cleared. If the S-flag of the PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request message
is set when the first EAP authentication has failed, the PaC can
choose not to perform the second EAP authentication by clearing
the S-flag of the PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer message. If the first
EAP authentication failed and the S-flag is not set in the PANA-
FirstAuth-End-Answer message as a result of those operations, the
PANA session MUST be immediately deleted. Otherwise, the second
EAP authentication MUST be performed.
o The PAA determines the execution order of NAP authentication and
ISP authentication. In this case, the PAA can indicate which
authentication (NAP authentication or ISP authentication) is
currently occurring by using N-flag in the PANA message header.
When NAP authentication is being performed, the N-flag MUST be
set. When ISP authentication is being performed, the N-flag MUST
NOT be set. The N-flag MUST NOT be set when S-flag is not set.
When the PaC and PAA have negotiated in the discovery and handshake
phase to perform separate NAP and ISP authentication, and the lower-
layer is insecure, the two EAP authentication methods used in the
separate authentication MUST be capable of deriving keys (AAA-Key).
4.8.3. AAA-Key Calculation
When the PaC and PAA have negotiated in the discovery and handshake		Figure 7: Example sequence for the termination phase triggered by PaC
phase to perform separate NAP and ISP authentication, if the lower-
layer is insecure, the two EAP authentication methods used in the
separate authentication MUST be capable of deriving keys. In this
case, if the first EAP authentication is successful, the PANA-
FirstAuth-End-Request and PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer messages as well
as PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer messages in the second EAP
authentication MUST be protected with the key derived from the AAA-
Key for the first EAP authentication. The PANA-Bind-Request and
PANA-Bind-Answer messages and all subsequent PANA messages exchanged
in the access phase, re-authentication phase and termination phase
MUST be protected either with the AAA-Key for the first EAP
authentication if the first EAP authentication succeeds and the
second EAP authentication fails, or with the AAA-Key for the second
EAP authentication if the first EAP authentication fails and the
second EAP authentication succeeds, or with the compound AAA-Key
derived from the two AAA-Keys, one for the first EAP authentication
and the other from the second EAP authentication, if both the first
and second EAP authentication succeed. See Section 5.3 for how to
derive the AAA-Key.
5. Processing Rules		5. Processing Rules
5.1. Fragmentation		5.1. Fragmentation
PANA does not provide fragmentation of PANA messages. Instead, it		PANA does not provide fragmentation of PANA messages. Instead, it
relies on fragmentation provided by EAP methods and IP layer when		relies on fragmentation provided by EAP methods and IP layer when
needed.		needed.
5.2. Sequence Number and Retransmission		5.2. Sequence Number and Retransmission
Skipping to change at page 24, line 28:
The PaC and PAA maintain two sequence numbers: the next one to be		The PaC and PAA maintain two sequence numbers: the next one to be
used for a request it initiates and the next one it expects to see in		used for a request it initiates and the next one it expects to see in
a request from the other end. These sequence numbers are 32-bit		a request from the other end. These sequence numbers are 32-bit
unsigned numbers. They are monotonically incremented by 1 as new		unsigned numbers. They are monotonically incremented by 1 as new
requests are generated and received, and wrapped to zero on the next		requests are generated and received, and wrapped to zero on the next
message after 2^32-1. Answers always contain the same sequence		message after 2^32-1. Answers always contain the same sequence
number as the corresponding request. Retransmissions reuse the		number as the corresponding request. Retransmissions reuse the
sequence number contained in the original packet.		sequence number contained in the original packet.
The initial sequence numbers (ISN) are randomly picked by the PaC and		The initial sequence numbers (ISN) are randomly picked by the PaC and
PAA as they send their very first request messages. PANA-PAA-		PAA as they send their very first request messages.
Discover message carries sequence number 0.		PANA-Client-Initiation message carries sequence number 0.
When a request message is received, it is considered valid in terms		When a request message is received, it is considered valid in terms
of sequence numbers if and only if its sequence number matches the		of sequence numbers if and only if its sequence number matches the
expected value. This check does not apply to the PANA-PAA-Discover,		expected value. This check does not apply to the
PANA-Start-Request messages.		PANA-Client-Initiation and PANA-Start-Request messages.
When an answer message is received, it is considered valid in terms		When an answer message is received, it is considered valid in terms
of sequence numbers if and only if its sequence number matches that		of sequence numbers if and only if its sequence number matches that
of the currently outstanding request. A peer can only have one		of the currently outstanding request. A peer can only have one
outstanding request at a time.		outstanding request at a time.
PANA messages are retransmitted based on a timer until a response is		PANA request messages are retransmitted based on a timer until a
received (in which case the retransmission timer is stopped) or the		response is received (in which case the retransmission timer is
number of retransmission reaches the maximum value (in which case the		stopped) or the number of retransmission reaches the maximum value
PANA session MUST be deleted immediately).		(in which case the PANA session MUST be deleted immediately).
The retransmission timers SHOULD be calculated as described in		The retransmission timers SHOULD be calculated as described in
[RFC2988] to provide congestion control. See Section 9 for default		Section 9 unless a given deployment chooses to use its own
timer and maximum retransmission count parameters.		retransmission timers optimized for the underlying link-layer
		characteristics.
The PaC and PAA MUST respond to duplicate requests as long as the		The PaC and PAA MUST respond to duplicate requests as long as the
responding rate does not exceed a certain threshold value. The last		responding rate does not exceed a certain threshold value. The last
transmitted answer MAY be cached in case it is not received by the		transmitted answer MAY be cached in case it is not received by the
peer and that generates a retransmission of the last request. When		peer and that generates a retransmission of the last request. When
available, the cached answer can be used instead of fully processing		available, the cached answer can be used instead of fully processing
the retransmitted request and forming a new answer from scratch.		the retransmitted request and forming a new answer from scratch.
PANA MUST NOT generate EAP message duplication. EAP payload of a
retransmitted PANA message MUST NOT be passed to the EAP layer.
5.3. PANA Security Association		5.3. PANA Security Association
A PANA SA is created as an attribute of a PANA session when EAP		A PANA SA is created as an attribute of a PANA session when EAP
authentication succeeds with a creation of a AAA-Key. A PANA SA is		authentication succeeds with a creation of an MSK. A PANA SA is not
not created when the PANA authentication fails or no AAA-Key is		created when the PANA authentication fails or no MSK is produced by
produced by any EAP authentication method. In the case where two EAP		any EAP authentication method. When a new MSK is derived in the PANA
sessions are performed in sequence in the PANA authentication and		re-authentication phase, any key derived from the old MSK MUST be
authorization phase, it is possible that two AAA-Keys are derived.		updated to a new one that is derived from the new MSK. In order to
If this happens, the PANA SA MUST be generated from both AAA-Keys.		distinguish the new MSK from old ones, one Key-Id AVP MUST be carried
When a new AAA-Key is derived in the PANA re-authentication phase,		in PANA-Bind-Request and PANA-Bind-Answer messages at the end of the
any key derived from the old AAA-Key MUST be updated to a new one		EAP authentication which resulted in deriving a new MSK. The Key-Id
that is derived from the new AAA-Key. In order to distinguish the
new AAA-Key from old ones, one Key-Id AVP MUST be carried in PANA-
Bind-Request and PANA-Bind-Answer messages or PANA-FirstAuth-End-
Request and PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer messages at the end of the EAP
authentication which resulted in deriving a new AAA-Key. The Key-Id
AVP is of type Unsigned32 and MUST contain a value that uniquely		AVP is of type Unsigned32 and MUST contain a value that uniquely
identifies the AAA-Key within the PANA session. The PANA-Bind-Answer		identifies the MSK within the PANA session. The PANA-Bind-Answer
message (or the PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer message) sent in response		message sent in response to a PANA-Bind-Request message with a Key-Id
to a PANA-Bind-Request message (or a PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request		AVP MUST contain a Key-Id AVP with the same MSK identifier carried in
message) with a Key-Id AVP MUST contain a Key-Id AVP with the same		the request. PANA-Bind-Request and PANA-Bind-Answer messages with a
AAA-Key identifier carried in the request. PANA-Bind-Request, PANA-		Key-Id AVP MUST also carry an AUTH AVP whose value is computed by
Bind-Answer, PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request and PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer		using the new PANA_AUTH_KEY derived from the new MSK. Although the
messages with a Key-Id AVP MUST also carry an AUTH AVP whose value is		specification does not mandate a particular method for calculation of
computed by using the new PANA_AUTH_KEY derived from the new AAA-Key		the Key-Id AVP value, a simple method is to use monotonically
(or the new pair of AAA-Keys when the PANA_AUTH_KEY is derived from		increasing numbers.
two AAA-Keys). Although the specification does not mandate a
particular method for calculation of the Key-Id AVP value, a simple
method is to use monotonically increasing numbers.
The PANA session lifetime is bounded by the authorization lifetime		The PANA session lifetime is bounded by the authorization lifetime
granted by the authentication server (same as the AAA-Key lifetime).		granted by the authentication server (same as the MSK lifetime). The
The lifetime of the PANA SA (hence the PANA_AUTH_KEY) is the same as		lifetime of the PANA SA (hence the PANA_AUTH_KEY) is the same as the
the lifetime of the PANA session. The created PANA SA is deleted		lifetime of the PANA session. The created PANA SA is deleted when
when the corresponding PANA session is deleted.		the corresponding PANA session is deleted.
PANA SA attributes as well as PANA session attributes are listed		PANA SA attributes as well as PANA session attributes are listed
below:		below:
PANA Session attributes:		PANA Session attributes:
* Session-Id		* Session Identifier
* Device-Id of PaC
* IP address and UDP port number of the PaC.		* IP address and UDP port number of the PaC.
* IP address of PAA		* IP address and UDP port number of the PAA
* List of device identifiers of EPs
* Sequence number of the last transmitted request		* Sequence number of the last transmitted request
* Sequence number of the last received request		* Sequence number of the last received request
* Last transmitted message payload		* Last transmitted message payload
* Retransmission interval		* Retransmission interval
* Session lifetime		* Session lifetime
* Protection-Capability
* PANA SA attributes		* PANA SA attributes
PANA SA attributes:		PANA SA attributes:
* Nonce generated by PaC (PaC_nonce)		* Nonce generated by PaC (PaC_nonce)
* Nonce generated by PAA (PAA_nonce)		* Nonce generated by PAA (PAA_nonce)
* AAA-Key		* MSK
* AAA-Key Identifier		* MSK Identifier
* PANA_AUTH_KEY		* PANA_AUTH_KEY
* Pseudo-random function		* Pseudo-random function
* Integrity algorithm		* Integrity algorithm
The PANA_AUTH_KEY is derived from the available AAA-Key(s) and it is		The PANA_AUTH_KEY is derived from the available MSK and it is used to
used to integrity protect PANA messages. If there is only one AAA-		integrity protect PANA messages. The PANA_AUTH_KEY is computed in
Key available, e.g., due to ISP-only authentication, or with one		the following way:
failed and one successful separate NAP and ISP authentication (see
Section 4.8), the PANA_AUTH_KEY computation is based on that single
key. Otherwise, two AAA-Keys available to PANA can be combined in
following way ('|' indicates concatenation):
AAA-Key = AAA-Key1 | AAA-Key2
The PANA_AUTH_KEY is computed in the following way:
PANA_AUTH_KEY = prf+(AAA-Key, PaC_nonce | PAA_nonce | Session-ID)		PANA_AUTH_KEY = prf+(MSK, PaC_nonce|PAA_nonce|Session_ID|Key_ID)
where the prf+ function is defined in IKEv2 [RFC4306]. The pseudo-		where the prf+ function is defined in IKEv2 [RFC4306]. The
random function to be used for the prf+ function is specified in the		pseudo-random function to be used for the prf+ function is specified
Algorithm AVP in a PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request or a PANA-Bind-Request		in the Algorithm AVP in a PANA-Bind-Request message. The length of
message. The length of PANA_AUTH_KEY depends on the integrity		PANA_AUTH_KEY depends on the integrity algorithm in use. See
algorithm in use. See Section 5.4 for the detailed usage of the		Section 5.4 for the detailed usage of the PANA_AUTH_KEY. PaC_nonce
PANA_AUTH_KEY.		and PAA_nonce are values of the Nonce AVP carried in the first
		PANA-Auth-Answer and PANA-Auth-Request messages in the authentication
		and authorization phase or the re-authentication phase, respectively.
		Session_ID is the session identifier of the session. Key_ID is the
		value of the Key-ID AVP.
5.4. Message Authentication		5.4. Message Authentication
A PANA message can contain an AUTH AVP for cryptographically		A PANA message can contain an AUTH AVP for cryptographically
protecting the message.		protecting the message.
When an AUTH AVP is included in a PANA message, the value field of		When an AUTH AVP is included in a PANA message, the value field of
the AUTH AVP is calculated by using the PANA_AUTH_KEY in the		the AUTH AVP is calculated by using the PANA_AUTH_KEY in the
following way:		following way:
AUTH AVP value = PANA_AUTH_HASH(PANA_AUTH_KEY, PANA_PDU)		AUTH AVP value = PANA_AUTH_HASH(PANA_AUTH_KEY, PANA_PDU)
where PANA_PDU is the PANA message including the PANA header, with		where PANA_PDU is the PANA message including the PANA header, with
the AUTH AVP value field first initialized to 0. PANA_AUTH_HASH		the AUTH AVP value field first initialized to 0. PANA_AUTH_HASH
represents the integrity algorithm specified in the Algorithm AVP in		represents the integrity algorithm specified in the Algorithm AVP in
a PANA-Bind-Request message. The PaC and PAA MUST use the same		a PANA-Bind-Request message. The PaC and PAA MUST use the same
integrity algorithm to calculate an AUTH AVP they originate and		integrity algorithm to calculate an AUTH AVP they originate and
receive. The algorithm is determined by the PAA. When the PaC does		receive. The algorithm is determined by the PAA. When the PaC does
not support the integrity algorithm specified in the PANA-Bind-		not support the integrity algorithm specified in the
Request message, it MUST silently discard the message.		PANA-Bind-Request message, it MUST silently discard the message.
5.5. Message Validity Check		5.5. Message Validity Check
When a PANA message is received, the message is considered to be		When a PANA message is received, the message is considered to be
invalid at least when one of the following conditions are not met:		invalid at least when one of the following conditions are not met:
o Each field in the message header contains a valid value including		o Each field in the message header contains a valid value including
sequence number, message length, message type, version number,		sequence number, message length, message type, version number,
flags, etc.		flags, session identifier, etc.
o The message type is one of the expected types in the current		o The message type is one of the expected types in the current
state. Specifically the following messages are unexpected and		state. Specifically the following messages are unexpected and
invalid:		invalid:
* In the discovery and handshake phase:		* In the handshake phase:
+ PANA-Termination-Request and PANA-Ping-Request.		+ PANA-Termination-Request and PANA-Ping-Request.
+ PANA-Bind-Request.		+ PANA-Bind-Request.
+ PANA-Update-Request.		+ PANA-Update-Request.
+ PANA-Reauth-Request.		+ PANA-Reauth-Request.
+ PANA-Error-Request.		+ PANA-Error-Request.
* In the authentication and authorization phase and the re-		* In the authentication and authorization phase and the
authentication phase:		re-authentication phase:
+ PANA-PAA-Discover.		+ PANA-Client-Initiation.
+ PANA-Update-Request.		+ PANA-Update-Request.
+ PANA-Start-Request after a PaC receives the first valid		+ PANA-Start-Request after a PaC receives the first valid
PANA-Auth-Request.		PANA-Auth-Request.
+ PANA-Termination-Request before the PaC receives the first		+ PANA-Termination-Request before the PaC receives the first
successful PANA-Bind-Request.		successful PANA-Bind-Request.
* In the access phase:		* In the access phase:
+ PANA-Start-Request as well as a non-duplicate PANA-Bind-		+ PANA-Start-Request as well as a non-duplicate
Request.		PANA-Bind-Request.
+ PANA-PAA-Discover.		+ PANA-Client-Initiation.
* In the termination phase:		* In the termination phase:
+ PANA-PAA-Discover.		+ PANA-Client-Initiation.
+ All requests but PANA-Termination-Request.		+ All requests but PANA-Termination-Request.
o The message payload contains a valid set of AVPs allowed for the		o The message payload contains a valid set of AVPs allowed for the
message type and there is no missing AVP that needs to be included		message type and there is no missing AVP that needs to be included
in the payload and no AVP, which needs to be at a fixed position,		in the payload and no AVP, which needs to be at a fixed position,
is included in a position different from this fixed position.		is included in a position different from this fixed position.
o Each AVP is decoded correctly.		o Each AVP is decoded correctly.
o When an AUTH AVP is included, the AVP value matches the hash value		o When an AUTH AVP is included, the AVP value matches the hash value
computed against the received message.		computed against the received message.
o When a Device-Id AVP is included, the AVP is valid if the device
identifier type contained in the AVP is supported (check performed
by both the PaC and the PAA) and is the requested one (check
performed by the PAA only). Note that a Device-Id AVP carries the
device identifier of the PaC in messages from the PaC to the PAA
and the device identifier(s) of the EP(s) in messages from the PAA
to the PaC.
Invalid messages MUST be discarded in order to provide robustness		Invalid messages MUST be discarded in order to provide robustness
against DoS attacks. In addition, an error notification message MAY		against DoS attacks. In addition, an error notification message MAY
be returned to the sender. See Section 5.11 for details.		be returned to the sender. See Section 5.8 for details.
5.6. PaC-EP-Master-Key
As described in Section 4.4, use of a cryptographic filtering
mechanism is indicated by inclusion of a Protection-Capability AVP in
the PANA-Bind-Request message in the authentication and authorization
phase. In this case, a PaC-EP-Master-Key is derived from the AAA-Key
for each EP and used by a secure association protocol for
bootstrapping link-layer or IPsec ciphering between the PaC and EP.
The PaC-EP-Master-Key derivation algorithm is defined as follows.
PaC-EP-Master-Key = The first 64 octets of
prf+(AAA-Key, "PaC-EP master key" |
Session ID | Key-ID | EP-Device-Id)
The prf+ function is defined in IKEv2 [RFC4306]. The pseudo-random
function used for the prf+ function is specified in the Algorithm AVP
carried in a PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request or a PANA-Bind-Request
message.
EP-Device-Id is the Data field of the Device-Id AVP for the
corresponding EP.
5.7. Device ID Choice
The device identifier used in the context of PANA can be an IP
address, a MAC address, or an identifier that may not be carried in
data packets but has local significance in identifying a connected
device (e.g., circuit id, PPP interface id). The last type of
identifiers are commonly used in point-to-point links where MAC
addresses are not available and lower-layers are already physically
or cryptographically secured.
It is assumed that the PAA knows the link type and the security
mechanisms being provided or required on the access network (based on
configuration of the network administrator). For example, one
network administrator might want to use IPsec for securing the
network access while another one (for a different network) might rely
on physical security.
When IPsec-based security [I-D.ietf-pana-ipsec] is the choice of
access control, the PAA MUST provide IP address(es) as EP(s)' device
ID, and expect the PaC to provide its IP address in return.
Similarly, IP addresses are used when the EP(s) is not on the same IP
subnet as the PaC is.
In other cases, MAC addresses are used as device identifiers when
they are available.
If non-IPsec access control is enabled, and a MAC address is not
available, locally-significant identifiers (e.g., as a circuit id)
MUST be used as device id. Note that these identifiers are not
exchanged within PANA messages. Instead, peers rely on lower-layers
to provide them along with received PANA messages.
5.8. PaC Updating its IP Address
A PaC's IP address can change in certain situations. For example,		5.6. PaC Updating its IP Address
the PANA framework [I-D.ietf-pana-framework] describes a case in
which a PaC replaces a pre-PANA address (PRPA) with a post-PANA
address (POPA). In another situation a PaC may change its IP address
used for PANA when it moves from one IP link to another within the
same PAA's realm. In order to maintain the PANA session, the PAA
needs to be notified about the change of PaC address.
If the device identifier of the PaC is the IP address, it is also		A PaC's IP address used for PANA can change in certain situations,
subject to the same change. The PAA needs to be notified about the		e.g., when the PaC moves from one IP link to another within the same
change of device identifier as well so that the PAA can update the		PAA's realm. In order to maintain the PANA session, the PAA needs to
EP(s). If IPsec is used between the PaC and the EPs, an IKE or		be notified about the change of PaC address.
MOBIKE [I-D.ietf-mobike-protocol] run is needed following such a
change.
After the PaC has changed its IP address, it MUST send a PANA-Update-		After the PaC has changed its IP address used for PANA, it MUST send
Request message to the PAA. If the PaC has also changed its device		a PANA-Update-Request message to the PAA. The PAA MUST update the
identifier, the PANA-Update-Request message MUST include a Device-Id
AVP containing the new device identifier. The PAA MUST update the
PANA session with the new PaC address carried in the Source Address		PANA session with the new PaC address carried in the Source Address
field of the IP header and the new device identifier carried in the		field of the IP header and return a PANA-Update-Answer message. If
Device-Id AVP, and return a PANA-Update-Answer message. The PANA-		there is an established PANA SA, both PANA-Update-Request and
Update-Answer message MUST contain one or more Device-Id AVPs for the		PANA-Update-Answer messages MUST be protected with an AUTH AVP.
EPs if the set of EPs serving the PaC has also changed. If there is
an established PANA SA, both PANA-Update-Request and PANA-Update-
Answer messages MUST be protected with an AUTH AVP.
5.9. Session Lifetime		5.7. Session Lifetime
The authentication and authorization phase determines the PANA		The authentication and authorization phase determines the PANA
session lifetime when the network access authorization succeeds. The		session lifetime when the network access authorization succeeds. The
Session-Lifetime AVP MAY be optionally included in the PANA-Bind-		Session-Lifetime AVP MAY be optionally included in the
Request message to inform the PaC about the valid lifetime of the		PANA-Bind-Request message to inform the PaC about the valid lifetime
PANA session. It MUST be ignored when included in other PANA		of the PANA session. It MUST be ignored when included in other PANA
messages.		messages.
When the Session-Lifetime AVP is not included in the PANA-Bind-		When the Session-Lifetime AVP is not included in the
Request message then the PaC has no knowledge about a PANA session		PANA-Bind-Request message then the PaC has no knowledge about a PANA
limitation and must therefore conclude that the session is not		session limitation and must therefore conclude that the session is
limited.		not limited.
The lifetime is a non-negotiable parameter that can be used by the		The lifetime is a non-negotiable parameter that can be used by the
PaC to manage PANA-related state. The PaC does not have to perform		PaC to manage PANA-related state. The PaC does not have to perform
any actions when the lifetime expires, other than purging local		any actions when the lifetime expires, other than purging local
state. The PAA SHOULD initiate the PANA re-authentication phase		state. The PAA SHOULD initiate the PANA re-authentication phase
before the current session lifetime expires.		before the current session lifetime expires.
The PaC and the PAA MAY use information obtained outside PANA (e.g.,		The PaC and the PAA MAY use information obtained outside PANA (e.g.,
lower-layer indications) to expedite the detection of a disconnected		lower-layer indications) to expedite the detection of a disconnected
peer. Availability and reliability of such indications MAY depend on		peer. Availability and reliability of such indications MAY depend on
a specific link layer or network topology and are therefore only		a specific link-layer or network topology and are therefore only
hints. A PANA peer SHOULD use the PANA-Ping message exchange to		hints. A PANA peer SHOULD use the PANA-Ping message exchange to
verify the liveness of a peer before taking an action.		verify that a peer is, in fact, no longer alive, unless information
		obtained outside PANA is being used to expedite the detection of a
		disconnected peer.
The session lifetime parameter is not related to the transmission of		The session lifetime parameter is not related to the transmission of
PANA-Ping-Request messages. These messages can be used for		PANA-Ping-Request messages. These messages can be used for
asynchronously verifying the liveness of the peer. The decision to		asynchronously verifying the liveness of the peer. The decision to
send a PANA-Ping-Request message is taken locally and does not		send a PANA-Ping-Request message is taken locally and does not
require coordination between the peers.		require coordination between the peers.
When separate ISP and NAP authentication is performed, it is possible		5.8. Error Handling
that different authorization lifetime values are associated with the
two EAP authentication sessions. In this case, the smaller
authorization lifetime value MUST be used for calculating the PANA
Session-Lifetime value. As a result, both NAP and ISP authentication
will be performed in the re-authentication phase.
5.10. Network Selection
The PANA discovery and handshake phase allows the PaC to learn
identity of the NAP and a list of ISPs that are available through the
NAP. The PaC can not only learn the ISPs but also convey the
selected ISP explicitly during the handshake phase. The PAA is
assumed to be pre-configured with the information of ISPs that are
served by the NAP.
A PANA-Start-Request message sent from the PAA MAY contain zero or
one NAP-Information AVP, and zero or more ISP-Information AVPs. The
PaC MAY indicate its choice of ISP by including an ISP-Information
AVP in the PANA-Start-Answer message. The PaC MAY convey its ISP
even when there is no ISP-Information AVP contained in the PANA-
Start-Request message. The PaC can do that when it is pre-configured
with ISP information.
In the absence of an ISP explicitly selected and conveyed by the PaC,
ISP selection is typically performed based on the client identifier
(e.g., using the realm portion of an NAI carried in EAP method). A
backend AAA protocol (e.g., RADIUS) will run between the AAA client
on the PAA and a AAA server in the selected ISP domain.
The PANA-based ISP selection mechanism dictates the next-hop AAA
proxy on the PAA. If the NAP requires all AAA traffic to go through
its local AAA proxy, it may have to rely on a mechanism to relay the
selected ISP information from PAA (AAA client) to the local AAA
proxy. The local AAA proxy can forward the AAA traffic to the
selected ISP domain upon processing. Further details, including how
the AAA client relays AAA routing information to the AAA proxy, are
outside the scope of PANA.
An alternative ISP discovery mechanism is outlined in [RFC4284] which
suggests advertising ISP information in-band with the ongoing EAP
method execution. Deployments using the PANA's built-in ISP
discovery mechanism need not use the other mechanism.
5.11. Error Handling
A PANA-Error-Request message MAY be sent by either the PaC or the PAA		A PANA-Error-Request message MAY be sent by either the PaC or the PAA
when a badly formed PANA message is received or in case of other		when a badly formed PANA message is received or in case of other
errors. The receiver of this request MUST respond with a PANA-Error-		errors. The receiver of this request MUST respond with a
Answer message.		PANA-Error-Answer message.
An adversary might craft erroneous PANA messages to launch a Denial		An adversary might craft erroneous PANA messages to launch a Denial
of Service attack. Unless the PaC or the PAA performs a rate-		of Service attack. Unless the PaC or the PAA performs a
limitation of the generated PANA-Error-Request messages it may be		rate-limitation of the generated PANA-Error-Request messages it may
overburdened by responding to bogus messages. Note that a PANA-		be overburdened by responding to bogus messages. Note that a
Error-Answer message that is sent in response to a PANA-Error-Request		PANA-Error-Answer message that is sent in response to a
message does not require either the PaC or the PAA to create state.		PANA-Error-Request message does not require either the PaC or the PAA
		to create a state.
If an error message is sent unprotected (i.e., without using an AUTH		If an error message is sent unprotected (i.e., without using an AUTH
AVP) and the lower-layer is insecure then the error message MUST be		AVP) then the error message MUST be processed such that the receiver
processed such that the receiver does not change its state.		does not change its state.
6. Header Format		6. Header Format
This section defines message formats for PANA protocol.		This section defines message formats for PANA protocol.
6.1. IP and UDP Headers		6.1. IP and UDP Headers
When a PANA-PAA-Discover message is multicast, IP destination address		Any PANA message is unicast between the PaC and the PAA.
of the message is set to a well-known administratively scoped
multicast address (To Be Assigned by IANA). A PANA-PAA-Discover
message MAY be unicast in some cases as specified in Section 4.3.
Any other PANA message is unicast between the PaC and the PAA. The
source and destination addresses SHOULD be set to the addresses on
the interfaces from which the message will be sent and received,
respectively.
When the PANA message is sent in response to a request, the UDP		When the PANA message is sent in response to a request, the UDP
source and destination ports of the response message MUST be copied		source and destination ports of the response message MUST be copied
from the destination and source ports of the request message,		from the destination and source ports of the request message,
respectively.		respectively.
The source port of an unsolicited PANA message MUST be set to a value		For other PANA messages, the source port MUST be set to a value
chosen by the sender. The destination port MUST be set to the peer's		chosen by the sender and the destination port MUST be set to the
port number if it has already been discovered via earlier PANA		assigned PANA port (To Be Assigned by IANA).
exchanges, set to the assigned PANA port (To Be Assigned by IANA)
otherwise.
6.2. PANA Header		6.2. PANA Message Header
A summary of the PANA header format is shown below. The fields are		A summary of the PANA message header format is shown below. The
transmitted in network byte order.		fields are transmitted in network byte order.
0 1 2 3		0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1		0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Version | Reserved | Message Length |		| Version | Reserved | Message Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Flags | Message Type |		| Flags | Message Type |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
		| Session Identifier |
		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Sequence Number |		| Sequence Number |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AVPs ...		| AVPs ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
Version		Version
This Version field MUST be set to 1 to indicate PANA Version 1.		This Version field MUST be set to 1 to indicate PANA Version 1.
Reserved		Reserved
This 8-bit field is reserved for future use, and MUST be set to		This 8-bit field is reserved for future use, and MUST be set to
zero, and ignored by the receiver.		zero, and ignored by the receiver.
Message Length		Message Length
Skipping to change at page 34, line 25:
The Message Length field is two octets and indicates the length of		The Message Length field is two octets and indicates the length of
the PANA message including the header fields.		the PANA message including the header fields.
Flags		Flags
The Flags field is two octets. The following bits are assigned:		The Flags field is two octets. The following bits are assigned:
0 1		0 1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5		0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|R S N L r r r r r r r r r r r r|		|R r r r r r r r r r r r r r r r|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
R(equest)		R(equest)
If set, the message is a request. If cleared, the message is		If set, the message is a request. If cleared, the message is
an answer.		an answer.
S(eparate)
When the S-flag is set in a PANA-Start-Request message it
indicates that PAA is willing to offer separate NAP and ISP
authentication. When the S-flag is set in a PANA-Start-Answer
message it indicates that the PaC accepts on performing
separate NAP and ISP authentication. The PaC may also respond
with the S-flag not set which implies the PaC has chosen to
authenticate with the ISP only. When the S-flag is set in a
PANA-Auth-Request/Answer, PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request/Answer and
PANA-Bind-Request/Answer messages it indicates that separate
NAP and ISP authentication is being performed in the
authentication and authorization phase. For other cases,
S-flag MUST NOT be set.
N(AP authentication)
When the N-flag is set in a PANA-Auth-Request, a PANA-
FirstAuth-End-Request or a PANA-Bind-Request message, it
indicates that the current EAP authentication is for NAP
authentication. When the N-flag is unset in a PANA-Auth-
Request, a PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request or a PANA-Bind-Request
message, it indicates that the current EAP authentication is
for ISP authentication. The PaC MUST copy the value of the
flag in its answer from the last received request of the PAA.
The value of the flag on an answer MUST be copied from the
request. The N-flag MUST NOT be set when S-flag is not set.
L(stateLess discovery)
When the L-flag is set in a PANA-Start-Request message it
indicates that the PAA is performing stateless discovery.
Cookie AVP MUST be included in both the PANA-Start-Request and
the PANA-Start-Answer messages when performing stateless
discovery.
r(eserved)		r(eserved)
These flag bits are reserved for future use, and MUST be set to		These flag bits are reserved for future use, and MUST be set to
zero, and ignored by the receiver.		zero, and ignored by the receiver.
Message Type		Message Type
The Message Type field is two octets, and is used in order to		The Message Type field is two octets, and is used in order to
communicate the message type with the message. The 16-bit address		communicate the message type with the message. The 16-bit address
space is managed by IANA [ianaweb]. PANA uses its own address		space is managed by IANA [ianaweb].
space for this field.
		Session Identifier
		This field contains a 32 bit session identifier.
Sequence Number		Sequence Number
The Sequence Number field contains a 32 bit value.		This field contains contains a 32 bit sequence number.
AVPs		AVPs
AVPs are a method of encapsulating information relevant to the		AVPs are a method of encapsulating information relevant to the
PANA message. See section Section 6.3 for more information on		PANA message. See section Section 6.3 for more information on
AVPs.		AVPs.
6.3. AVP Header		6.3. AVP Header
Each AVP of type OctetString MUST be padded to align on a 32-bit		Each AVP of type OctetString MUST be padded to align on a 32-bit
boundary, while other AVP types align naturally. A number of zero-		boundary, while other AVP types align naturally. A number of
valued bytes are added to the end of the AVP Data field till a word		zero-valued bytes are added to the end of the AVP Data field till a
boundary is reached. The length of the padding is not reflected in		word boundary is reached. The length of the padding is not reflected
the AVP Length field [RFC3588].		in the AVP Length field [RFC3588].
The fields in the AVP header are sent in network byte order. The		The fields in the AVP header are sent in network byte order. The
format of the header is:		format of the header is:
0 1 2 3		0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1		0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AVP Code | AVP Flags |		| AVP Code | AVP Flags |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AVP Length | Reserved |		| AVP Length | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Vendor-Id (opt) |		| Vendor-Id (opt) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Data ...		| Data ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
AVP Code		AVP Code
The AVP Code, combined with the Vendor-Id field, identifies the		The AVP Code, together with the optional Vendor ID field,
attribute uniquely. AVP numbers are allocated by IANA [ianaweb].		identifies attribute that follows. If the V-bit is not set, the
PANA uses its own address space for this field although some of		Vendor ID is not present and the AVP Code refers to an IETF
the AVP formats are borrowed from Diameter protocol [RFC3588].		attribute.
AVP Flags		AVP Flags
The AVP Flags field is two octets. The following bits are		The AVP Flags field is two octets. The following bits are
assigned:		assigned:
0 1		0 1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5		0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|V M r r r r r r r r r r r r r r|		|V M r r r r r r r r r r r r r r|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
M(andatory)
The 'M' Bit, known as the Mandatory bit, indicates whether
support of the AVP is required.
If an AVP with the 'M' bit set is received by the PaC or PAA
and either the AVP or its value is unrecognized, the message
MUST be rejected and the receiver MUST send a PANA-Error-
Request message. If the AVP was unrecognized the PANA-Error-
Request message result code MUST be PANA_AVP_UNSUPPORTED. If
the AVP value was unrecognized the PANA-Error-Request message
result code MUST be PANA_INVALID_AVP_DATA. In either case the
PANA-Error-Request message MUST carry a Failed-AVP AVP
containing the offending mandatory AVP.
AVPs with the 'M' bit cleared are informational only and a
receiver that receives a message with such an AVP that is not
recognized, or whose value is not recognized, MAY simply ignore
the AVP.
V(endor)		V(endor)
The 'V' bit, known as the Vendor-Specific bit, indicates		The 'V' bit, known as the Vendor-Specific bit, indicates
whether the optional Vendor-Id field is present in the AVP		whether the optional Vendor-Id field is present in the AVP
header. When set the AVP Code belongs to the specific vendor		header. When set the AVP Code belongs to the specific vendor
code address space.		code address space.
		M(andatory)
		The 'M' Bit, known as the Mandatory bit, indicates whether
		support of the AVP is required. If an AVP with the 'M' bit set
		is received by the PaC or PAA and either the AVP or its value
		is unrecognized, the message MUST be rejected and the receiver
		MUST send a PANA-Error-Request message. If the AVP was
		unrecognized the PANA-Error-Request message result code MUST be
		PANA_AVP_UNSUPPORTED. If the AVP value was unrecognized the
		PANA-Error-Request message result code MUST be
		PANA_INVALID_AVP_DATA. In either case the PANA-Error-Request
		message MUST carry a Failed-AVP AVP containing the offending
		mandatory AVP. AVPs with the 'M' bit cleared are informational
		only and a receiver that receives a message with such an AVP
		that is not recognized, or whose value is not recognized, MAY
		simply ignore the AVP.
r(eserved)		r(eserved)
These flag bits are reserved for future use, and MUST be set to		These flag bits are reserved for future use, and MUST be set to
zero, and ignored by the receiver.		zero, and ignored by the receiver.
Unless otherwise noted, AVPs defined in this document will have
the following default AVP Flags field settings: The 'M' bit MUST
be set. The 'V' bit MUST NOT be set.
AVP Length		AVP Length
The AVP Length field is two octets, and indicates the number of		The AVP Length field is two octets, and indicates the number of
octets in this AVP including the AVP Code, AVP Length, AVP Flags,		octets in this AVP including the AVP Code, AVP Length, AVP Flags,
and the AVP data.		and the AVP data.
Reserved		Reserved
This two-octet field is reserved for future use, and MUST be set		This two-octet field is reserved for future use, and MUST be set
to zero, and ignored by the receiver.		to zero, and ignored by the receiver.
Skipping to change at page 38, line 4:
The Vendor-Id field is present if the 'V' bit is set in the AVP		The Vendor-Id field is present if the 'V' bit is set in the AVP
Flags field. The optional four-octet Vendor-Id field contains the		Flags field. The optional four-octet Vendor-Id field contains the
IANA assigned "SMI Network Management Private Enterprise Codes"		IANA assigned "SMI Network Management Private Enterprise Codes"
[ianaweb] value, encoded in network byte order. Any vendor		[ianaweb] value, encoded in network byte order. Any vendor
wishing to implement a vendor-specific PANA AVP MUST use their own		wishing to implement a vendor-specific PANA AVP MUST use their own
Vendor-Id along with their privately managed AVP address space,		Vendor-Id along with their privately managed AVP address space,
guaranteeing that they will not collide with any other vendor's		guaranteeing that they will not collide with any other vendor's
vendor-specific AVP(s), nor with future IETF applications.		vendor-specific AVP(s), nor with future IETF applications.
Data		Data
The Data field is zero or more octets and contains information		The Data field is zero or more octets and contains information
specific to the Attribute. The format and length of the Data		specific to the Attribute. The format and length of the Data
field is determined by the AVP Code and AVP Length fields.		field is determined by the AVP Code and AVP Length fields.
		Unless otherwise noted, AVPs defined in this document will have the
		following default AVP Flags field settings: The 'M' bit MUST be set.
		The 'V' bit MUST NOT be set.
7. PANA Messages		7. PANA Messages
Each Request/Answer message pair is assigned a Sequence Number, and		Each Request/Answer message pair is assigned a Sequence Number, and
the sub-type (i.e., request or answer) is identified via the 'R' bit		the sub-type (i.e., request or answer) is identified via the 'R' bit
in the Message Flags field of the PANA header.		in the Message Flags field of the PANA message header.
Every PANA message MUST contain a message ID in its header's		Every PANA message MUST contain a message ID in its header's Message
Message-Id field, which is used to determine the action that is to be		Type field, which is used to determine the action that is to be taken
taken for a particular message. Figure 9 lists all PANA messages		for a particular message. Figure 8 lists all PANA messages defined
defined in this document:		in this document:
Message-Name Abbrev. ID PaC<->PAA Ref.		Message-Name Abbrev. ID PaC<->PAA Ref.
----------------------------------------------------------		----------------------------------------------------------
PANA-PAA-Discover PDI 1 --------> 7.1		PANA-Client-Initiation PCI 1 --------> 7.1
PANA-Start-Request PSR 2 <-------- 7.2		PANA-Start-Request PSR 2 <-------- 7.2
PANA-Start-Answer PSA 2 --------> 7.3		PANA-Start-Answer PSA 2 --------> 7.3
PANA-Auth-Request PAR 3 <-------> 7.4		PANA-Auth-Request PAR 3 <-------> 7.4
PANA-Auth-Answer PAN 3 <-------> 7.5		PANA-Auth-Answer PAN 3 <-------> 7.5
PANA-Reauth-Request PRAR 4 --------> 7.6		PANA-Reauth-Request PRR 4 --------> 7.6
PANA-Reauth-Answer PRAA 4 <-------- 7.7		PANA-Reauth-Answer PRA 4 <-------- 7.7
PANA-Bind-Request PBR 5 <-------- 7.8		PANA-Bind-Request PBR 5 <-------- 7.8
PANA-Bind-Answer PBA 5 --------> 7.9		PANA-Bind-Answer PBA 5 --------> 7.9
PANA-Ping-Request PPR 6 <-------> 7.10		PANA-Ping-Request PPR 6 <-------> 7.10
PANA-Ping-Answer PPA 6 <-------> 7.11		PANA-Ping-Answer PPA 6 <-------> 7.11
PANA-Termination-Request PTR 7 <-------> 7.12		PANA-Termination-Request PTR 7 <-------> 7.12
PANA-Termination-Answer PTA 7 <-------> 7.13		PANA-Termination-Answer PTA 7 <-------> 7.13
PANA-Error-Request PER 8 <-------> 7.14		PANA-Error-Request PER 8 <-------> 7.14
PANA-Error-Answer PEA 8 <-------> 7.15		PANA-Error-Answer PEA 8 <-------> 7.15
PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request PFER 9 <-------- 7.16		PANA-Update-Request PUR 9 <-------> 7.16
PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer PFEA 9 --------> 7.17		PANA-Update-Answer PUA 9 <-------> 7.17
PANA-Update-Request PUR 10 <-------> 7.18
PANA-Update-Answer PUA 10 <-------> 7.19
-----------------------------------------------------------		-----------------------------------------------------------
Figure 9: Table of PANA Messages		Figure 8: Table of PANA Messages
Every PANA message defined MUST include a corresponding ABNF		Every PANA message defined MUST include a corresponding ABNF
[RFC2234] specification, which is used to define the AVPs that MUST		[RFC2234] specification, which is used to define the AVPs that MUST
or MAY be present. The following format is used in the definition:		or MAY be present. The following format is used in the definition:
message-def = Message-Name "::=" PANA-message		message-def = Message-Name "::=" PANA-message
message-name = PANA-name		message-name = PANA-name
PANA-name = ALPHA *(ALPHA / DIGIT / "-")		PANA-name = ALPHA *(ALPHA / DIGIT / "-")
PANA-message = header [ *fixed] [ *required] [ *optional]		PANA-message = header [ *fixed] [ *required] [ *optional]
[ *fixed]		[ *fixed]
header = "< PANA-Header: " Message-Id
[r-bit] [s-bit] [n-bit] ">"
Message-Id = 1*DIGIT		header = "< PANA-Header: " Message-Type
; The message code assigned to the message		[r-bit] ">"
		Message-Type = 1*DIGIT
		; The Message Type assigned to the message
r-bit = ", REQ"		r-bit = ", REQ"
; If present, the 'R' bit in the Message		; If present, the 'R' bit in the Message
; Flags is set, indicating that the message		; Flags is set, indicating that the message
; is a request, as opposed to an answer.		; is a request, as opposed to an answer.
s-bit = ", SEP"
; If present, the 'S' bit in the Message
; Flags is set, indicating support for
; separate NAP and ISP authentication.
n-bit = ", NAP"
; If present, the 'N' bit in the Message
; Flags is set, indicating that current
; EAP authentication is for NAP authentication.
l-bit = ", SLS"
; If present, the 'L' bit in the Message
; Flags is set, indicating PAA is performing
; stateless discovery
fixed = [qual] "<" avp-spec ">"		fixed = [qual] "<" avp-spec ">"
; Defines the fixed position of an AVP		; Defines the fixed position of an AVP.
required = [qual] "{" avp-spec "}"		required = [qual] "{" avp-spec "}"
; The AVP MUST be present and can appear		; The AVP MUST be present and can appear
; anywhere in the message.		; anywhere in the message.
optional = [qual] "[" avp-name "]"		optional = [qual] "[" avp-name "]"
; The avp-name in the 'optional' rule cannot		; The avp-name in the 'optional' rule cannot
; evaluate to any AVP Name which is included		; evaluate to any AVP Name which is included
; in a fixed or required rule. The AVP can		; in a fixed or required rule. The AVP can
; appear anywhere in the message.		; appear anywhere in the message.
Skipping to change at page 41, line 35:
; in the base or extended PANA protocol		; in the base or extended PANA protocol
; specifications.		; specifications.
avp-name = avp-spec / "AVP"		avp-name = avp-spec / "AVP"
; The string "AVP" stands for *any* arbitrary		; The string "AVP" stands for *any* arbitrary
; AVP Name, which does not conflict with the		; AVP Name, which does not conflict with the
; required or fixed position AVPs defined in		; required or fixed position AVPs defined in
; the message definition.		; the message definition.
Example-Request ::= < "PANA-Header: 9999999, REQ >		Example-Request ::= < "PANA-Header: 9999999, REQ >
< Session-Id >
{ Result-Code }		{ Result-Code }
* [ AVP ]		* [ AVP ]
0*1 < AUTH >		0*1 < AUTH >
7.1. PANA-PAA-Discover (PDI)		7.1. PANA-Client-Initiation (PCI)
The PANA-PAA-Discover (PDI) message is used to discover the address		The PANA-Client-Initiation (PCI) message is used for PaC-initiated
of PAA(s). The sequence number in this message is always set to zero		handshake. The Sequence Number and Session Identifier fields in this
(0).		message MUST be set to zero (0).
PANA-PAA-Discover ::= < PANA-Header: 1 >		PANA-Client-Initiation ::= < PANA-Header: 1 >
[ Notification ]
* [ AVP ]		* [ AVP ]
7.2. PANA-Start-Request (PSR)		7.2. PANA-Start-Request (PSR)
The PANA-Start-Request (PSR) message is sent by the PAA to the PaC to		The PANA-Start-Request (PSR) message is sent by the PAA to the PaC to
advertise availability of the PAA and start PANA authentication. The		start PANA authentication. The PAA sets the Sequence Number field to
PAA sets the sequence number to an initial random value.		an initial random value and sets the Session Identifier field to a
		newly assigned value.
PANA-Start-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 2, REQ [,SEP] [,SLS] >		PANA-Start-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 2, REQ >
[ Nonce ]
[ Cookie ]
[ EAP-Payload ]		[ EAP-Payload ]
[ NAP-Information ]
* [ ISP-Information ]
[ Protection-Capability]
[ Algorithm ]		[ Algorithm ]
[ PPAC ]
[ Notification ]
* [ AVP ]		* [ AVP ]
7.3. PANA-Start-Answer (PSA)		7.3. PANA-Start-Answer (PSA)
The PANA-Start-Answer (PSA) message is sent by the PaC to the PAA in		The PANA-Start-Answer (PSA) message is sent by the PaC to the PAA in
response to a PANA-Start-Request message. This message completes the		response to a PANA-Start-Request message. This message completes the
handshake to start PANA authentication.		handshake to start PANA authentication.
PANA-Start-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 2 [,SEP] >		PANA-Start-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 2 >
[ Nonce ]
[ Cookie ]
[ EAP-Payload ]		[ EAP-Payload ]
[ ISP-Information ]
[ Notification ]
* [ AVP ]		* [ AVP ]
7.4. PANA-Auth-Request (PAR)		7.4. PANA-Auth-Request (PAR)
The PANA-Auth-Request (PAR) message is either sent by the PAA or the		The PANA-Auth-Request (PAR) message is either sent by the PAA or the
PaC. Its main task is to carry an EAP-Payload AVP.		PaC. Its main task is to carry an EAP-Payload AVP.
PANA-Auth-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 3, REQ [,SEP] [,NAP] >		PANA-Auth-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 3, REQ >
< Session-Id >
< EAP-Payload >		< EAP-Payload >
[ Nonce ]		[ Nonce ]
[ Notification ]
* [ AVP ]		* [ AVP ]
0*1 < AUTH >		0*1 < AUTH >
7.5. PANA-Auth-Answer (PAN)		7.5. PANA-Auth-Answer (PAN)
THe PANA-Auth-Answer (PAN) message is sent by either the PaC or the		The PANA-Auth-Answer (PAN) message is sent by either the PaC or the
PAA in response to a PANA-Auth-Request message. It MAY carry an EAP-		PAA in response to a PANA-Auth-Request message. It MAY carry an
Payload AVP.		EAP-Payload AVP.
PANA-Auth-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 3 [,SEP] [,NAP] >		PANA-Auth-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 3 >
< Session-Id >
[ Nonce ]		[ Nonce ]
[ EAP-Payload ]		[ EAP-Payload ]
[ Notification ]
* [ AVP ]		* [ AVP ]
0*1 < AUTH >		0*1 < AUTH >
7.6. PANA-Reauth-Request (PRAR)		7.6. PANA-Reauth-Request (PRR)
The PANA-Reauth-Request (PRAR) message is sent by the PaC to the PAA		The PANA-Reauth-Request (PRR) message is sent by the PaC to the PAA
to re-initiate EAP authentication.		to re-initiate EAP authentication.
PANA-Reauth-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 4, REQ >		PANA-Reauth-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 4, REQ >
< Session-Id >
[ Notification ]
* [ AVP ]		* [ AVP ]
0*1 < AUTH >		0*1 < AUTH >
7.7. PANA-Reauth-Answer (PRAA)		7.7. PANA-Reauth-Answer (PRA)
The PANA-Reauth-Answer (PRAA) message is sent by the PAA to the PaC		The PANA-Reauth-Answer (PRA) message is sent by the PAA to the PaC in
in response to a PANA-Reauth-Request message.		response to a PANA-Reauth-Request message.
PANA-Reauth-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 4 >		PANA-Reauth-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 4 >
< Session-Id >
[ Notification ]
* [ AVP ]		* [ AVP ]
0*1 < AUTH >		0*1 < AUTH >
7.8. PANA-Bind-Request (PBR)		7.8. PANA-Bind-Request (PBR)
The PANA-Bind-Request (PBR) message is sent by the PAA to the PaC to		The PANA-Bind-Request (PBR) message is sent by the PAA to the PaC to
deliver the result of PANA authentication.		deliver the result of PANA authentication.
PANA-Bind-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 5, REQ [,SEP] [,NAP] >		PANA-Bind-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 5, REQ >
< Session-Id >
{ Result-Code }		{ Result-Code }
[ PPAC ]
[ EAP-Payload ]		[ EAP-Payload ]
[ Session-Lifetime ]		[ Session-Lifetime ]
[ Protection-Capability ]
[ Key-Id ]		[ Key-Id ]
[ Algorithm ]		[ Algorithm ]
* [ Device-Id ]
[ Notification ]
* [ AVP ]		* [ AVP ]
0*1 < AUTH >		0*1 < AUTH >
7.9. PANA-Bind-Answer (PBA)		7.9. PANA-Bind-Answer (PBA)
The PANA-Bind-Answer (PBA) message is sent by the PaC to the PAA in		The PANA-Bind-Answer (PBA) message is sent by the PaC to the PAA in
response to a PANA-Bind-Request message.		response to a PANA-Bind-Request message.
PANA-Bind-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 5 [,SEP] [,NAP] >		PANA-Bind-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 5 >
< Session-Id >
[ PPAC ]
[ Device-Id ]
[ Key-Id ]		[ Key-Id ]
[ Notification ]
* [ AVP ]		* [ AVP ]
0*1 < AUTH >		0*1 < AUTH >
7.10. PANA-Ping-Request (PPR)		7.10. PANA-Ping-Request (PPR)
The PANA-Ping-Request (PPR) message is either sent by the PaC or the		The PANA-Ping-Request (PPR) message is either sent by the PaC or the
PAA for performing liveness test.		PAA for performing liveness test.
PANA-Ping-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 6, REQ >		PANA-Ping-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 6, REQ >
< Session-Id >
[ Notification ]
* [ AVP ]		* [ AVP ]
0*1 < AUTH >		0*1 < AUTH >
7.11. PANA-Ping-Answer (PPA)		7.11. PANA-Ping-Answer (PPA)
The PANA-Ping-Answer (PPA) message is sent in response to a PANA-		The PANA-Ping-Answer (PPA) message is sent in response to a
Ping-Request.		PANA-Ping-Request.
PANA-Ping-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 6 >		PANA-Ping-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 6 >
< Session-Id >
[ Notification ]
* [ AVP ]		* [ AVP ]
0*1 < AUTH >		0*1 < AUTH >
7.12. PANA-Termination-Request (PTR)		7.12. PANA-Termination-Request (PTR)
The PANA-Termination-Request (PTR) message is sent either by the PaC		The PANA-Termination-Request (PTR) message is sent either by the PaC
or the PAA to terminate a PANA session.		or the PAA to terminate a PANA session.
PANA-Termination-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 7, REQ >		PANA-Termination-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 7, REQ >
< Session-Id >
< Termination-Cause >		< Termination-Cause >
[ Notification ]
* [ AVP ]		* [ AVP ]
0*1 < AUTH >		0*1 < AUTH >
7.13. PANA-Termination-Answer (PTA)		7.13. PANA-Termination-Answer (PTA)
The PANA-Termination-Answer (PTA) message is sent either by the PaC		The PANA-Termination-Answer (PTA) message is sent either by the PaC
or the PAA in response to PANA-Termination-Request.		or the PAA in response to PANA-Termination-Request.
PANA-Termination-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 7 >		PANA-Termination-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 7 >
< Session-Id >
[ Notification ]
* [ AVP ]		* [ AVP ]
0*1 < AUTH >		0*1 < AUTH >
7.14. PANA-Error-Request (PER)		7.14. PANA-Error-Request (PER)
The PANA-Error-Request (PER) message is sent either by the PaC or the		The PANA-Error-Request (PER) message is sent either by the PaC or the
PAA to report an error with the last received PANA message.		PAA to report an error with the last received PANA message. This
		message MUST contain one Failed-Message-Header AVP which carries the
		content of the PANA message header of the erroneous message.
PANA-Error-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 8, REQ >		PANA-Error-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 8, REQ >
< Session-Id >
< Result-Code >		< Result-Code >
		{ Failed-Message-Header }
* [ Failed-AVP ]		* [ Failed-AVP ]
[ Notification ]
* [ AVP ]		* [ AVP ]
0*1 < AUTH >		0*1 < AUTH >
7.15. PANA-Error-Answer (PEA)		7.15. PANA-Error-Answer (PEA)
The PANA-Error-Answer (PEA) message is sent in response to a PANA-		The PANA-Error-Answer (PEA) message is sent in response to a
Error-Request.		PANA-Error-Request.
PANA-Error-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 8 >		PANA-Error-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 8 >
< Session-Id >
[ Notification ]
* [ AVP ]
0*1 < AUTH >
7.16. PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request (PFER)
The PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request (PFER) message is sent by the PAA to
the PaC to signal the result of the first EAP authentication method
when separate NAP and ISP authentication is performed.
PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 9, REQ [,SEP] [,NAP] >
< Session-Id >
{ Result-Code }
[ EAP-Payload ]
[ Key-Id ]
[ Algorithm ]
[ Notification ]
* [ AVP ]
0*1 < AUTH >
7.17. PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer (PFEA)
The PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer (PFEA) message is sent by the PaC to
the PAA in response to a PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request message.
PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 9, REQ [,SEP] [,NAP] >
< Session-Id >
[ Key-Id ]
[ Notification ]
* [ AVP ]		* [ AVP ]
0*1 < AUTH >		0*1 < AUTH >
7.18. PANA-Update-Request (PUR)		7.16. PANA-Update-Request (PUR)
The PANA-Update-Request (PUR) message is sent either by the PaC or		The PANA-Update-Request (PUR) message is sent either by the PaC or
the PAA to deliver attribute updates and notifications. In the scope		the PAA to deliver attribute updates. In the scope of this
of this specification only the IP address and device identifer of the		specification only the IP address the PaC can be updated via this
PaC can be updated via this message.		message.
PANA-Update-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 10, REQ >		PANA-Update-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 9, REQ >
< Session-Id >
[ Device-Id ]
[ Notification ]
* [ AVP ]		* [ AVP ]
0*1 < AUTH >		0*1 < AUTH >
7.19. PANA-Update-Answer (PUA)		7.17. PANA-Update-Answer (PUA)
The PANA-Update-Answer (PUA) message is sent by the PAA (PaC) to the		The PANA-Update-Answer (PUA) message is sent by the PAA (PaC) to the
PaC (PAA) in response to a PANA-Update-Request from the PaC (PAA).		PaC (PAA) in response to a PANA-Update-Request from the PaC (PAA).
PANA-Update-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 10 >		PANA-Update-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 9 >
< Session-Id >
* [ Device-Id ]
[ Notification ]
* [ AVP ]		* [ AVP ]
0*1 < AUTH >		0*1 < AUTH >
8. AVPs in PANA		8. AVPs in PANA
PANA defines several AVPs that are specific to the protocol. A		This document uses AVP Data Format such as 'OctetString' and
number of others AVPs are reused. These are specified in other		'Unsigned32' as defined in Section 4.2 of [RFC3588]. The definitions
documents such as [RFC3588].		of these data formats are not repeated in this document.
The following tables lists the AVPs used in this document, and		The following tables lists the AVPs used in this document, and
specifies in which PANA messages they MAY, or MAY NOT be present.		specifies in which PANA messages they MAY, or MAY NOT be present.
The table uses the following symbols:		The table uses the following symbols:
0 The AVP MUST NOT be present in the message.		0 The AVP MUST NOT be present in the message.
0+ Zero or more instances of the AVP MAY be present in the		0+ Zero or more instances of the AVP MAY be present in the
message.		message.
0-1 Zero or one instance of the AVP MAY be present in the message.		0-1 Zero or one instance of the AVP MAY be present in the message.
It is considered an error if there are more than one instance		It is considered an error if there are more than one instance
of the AVP.		of the AVP.
1 One instance of the AVP MUST be present in the message.		1 One instance of the AVP MUST be present in the message.
1+ At least one instance of the AVP MUST be present in the		1+ At least one instance of the AVP MUST be present in the
message.		message.
+---------------------------------------------+		+-------------------------------------------+
| Message |		| Message Type |
| Type |		+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+---+---+---+---+---+----+----+---+---+---+---+		Attribute Name |PCI|PSR|PSA|PAR|PAN|PRR|PRA|PBR|PBA|PPR|PPA|
Attribute Name |PDI|PSR|PSA|PAR|PAN|PRAR|PRAA|PBR|PBA|PPR|PPA|		----------------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
----------------------+---+---+---+---+---+----+----+---+---+---+---+
Algorithm | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 |		Algorithm | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 |
AUTH | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1|0-1|0-1 |0-1 |0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|		AUTH | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1|0-1|0-1 |0-1 |0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|
Cookie | 0 |0-1|0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Device-Id | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0+|0-1| 0 | 0 |
EAP-Payload | 0 |0-1|0-1| 1 |0-1| 0 | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 |		EAP-Payload | 0 |0-1|0-1| 1 |0-1| 0 | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 |
Failed-AVP | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |		Failed-AVP | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
ISP-Information | 0 | 0+|0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |		Failed-Message-Header | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Key-Id | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1|0-1| 0 | 0 |		Key-Id | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1|0-1| 0 | 0 |
NAP-Information | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |		Nonce | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1|0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Nonce | 0 |0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Notification |0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1 |0-1 |0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|
PPAC | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1|0-1| 0 | 0 |
Protection-Capability | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 |
Result-Code | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |		Result-Code | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Session-Id | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
Session-Lifetime | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 |		Session-Lifetime | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 |
Termination-Cause | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |		Termination-Cause | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
----------------------+---+---+---+---+---+----+----+---+---+---+---+		----------------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
Figure 10: AVP Occurrence Table (1/2)		Figure 9: AVP Occurrence Table (1/2)
+---------------------------------+		+-----------------------+
| Message |		| Message Type |
| Type |		+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+---+---+---+---+----+----+---+---+		Attribute Name |PTR|PTA|PER|PEA|PUR|PUA|
Attribute Name |PTR|PTA|PER|PEA|PFER|PFEA|PUR|PUA|		----------------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+
----------------------+---+---+---+---+----+----+---+---+		Algorithm | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Algorithm | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |		AUTH |0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|
AUTH |0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1 |0-1 |0-1|0-1|		EAP-Payload | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Cookie | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |		Failed-AVP | 0 | 0 | 0+| 0 | 0 | 0 |
Device-Id | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |		Failed-Message-Header | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
EAP-Payload | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |		Key-Id | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Failed-AVP | 0 | 0 | 0+| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |		Nonce | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
ISP-Information | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |		Result-Code | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Key-Id | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |0-1 |0-1 | 0 | 0 |		Session-Lifetime | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
NAP-Information | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |		Termination-Cause | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Nonce | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |		----------------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+
Notification |0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1 |0-1 |0-1|0-1|
PPAC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Protection-Capability | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Result-Code | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Session-Id | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
Session-Lifetime | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Termination-Cause | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
----------------------+---+---+---+---+----+----+---+---+
Figure 11: AVP Occurrence Table (2/2)		Figure 10: AVP Occurrence Table (2/2)
8.1. Algorithm AVP		8.1. Algorithm AVP
The Algorithm AVP (AVP Code 1) is used for conveying the pseudo-		The Algorithm AVP (AVP Code 1) is used for conveying the
random function to derive PANA_AUTH_KEY and PaC-EP-Master-Key as well		pseudo-random function to derive PANA_AUTH_KEY as well as the
as the integrity algorithm to compute an AUTH AVP. The AVP data is		integrity algorithm to compute an AUTH AVP. The AVP data is of type
of type Unsigned32.		Unsigned32.
The first 16-bit of the AVP data contains an IKEv2 Transform ID of		The first 16-bit of the AVP data contains an IKEv2 Transform ID of
Transform Type 2 [RFC4306] corresponding to the key derivation		Transform Type 2 [RFC4306] corresponding to the key derivation
function.		function.
The last 16-bit of the AVP data contains an IKEv2 Transform ID of		The last 16-bit of the AVP data contains an IKEv2 Transform ID of
Transform Type 3 [RFC4306] for the integrity algorithm.		Transform Type 3 [RFC4306] for the integrity algorithm.
All PANA implementations MUST support PRF_HMAC_SHA1 (2) [RFC2104] for		All PANA implementations MUST support PRF_HMAC_SHA1 (2) [RFC2104] for
the key derivation algorithm and AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_160 (7) [ianaweb]		the key derivation algorithm and AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_160 (7) [RFC4595]
corresponding to the integrity algorithm.		corresponding to the integrity algorithm.
8.2. AUTH AVP		8.2. AUTH AVP
The AUTH AVP (AVP Code 2) is used to integrity protect PANA messages.		The AUTH AVP (AVP Code 2) is used to integrity protect PANA messages.
The AVP data payload contains the Message Authentication Code encoded		The AVP data payload contains the Message Authentication Code encoded
in network byte order. The AVP length varies depending on the		in network byte order. The AVP length varies depending on the
integrity algorithm specified in an Algorithm AVP.		integrity algorithm specified in an Algorithm AVP.
8.3. Cookie AVP		8.3. EAP-Payload AVP
The Cookie AVP (AVP Code 3) is used for carrying a random value
generated by the PAA according to [RFC4086]. The AVP data is of type
OctetString. The random value is referred to as a cookie and used
for making PAA discovery robust against blind resource consumption
DoS attacks. The exact algorithms and syntax used by the PAA to
generate a cookie does not affect interoperability and not specified
in this document. An example cookie generation algorithm is shown in
Section 4.3.
8.4. Device-Id AVP
The Device-Id AVP (AVP Code 4) is used for carrying device
identifiers of PaC and EP(s). The AVP data is of Address type
[RFC3588]. IPv4 and IPv6 addresses are encoded as specified in
[RFC3588]. The content and format of data (including byte and bit
ordering) for link-layer addresses is expected to be specified in
specific documents that describe how IP operates over different link-
layers. For instance, [RFC2464]. Address families other than that
are defined for link-layer or IP addresses MUST NOT be used for this
AVP.
8.5. EAP-Payload AVP
The EAP-Payload AVP (AVP Code 5) is used for encapsulating the actual		The EAP-Payload AVP (AVP Code 3) is used for encapsulating the actual
EAP message that is being exchanged between the EAP peer and the EAP		EAP message that is being exchanged between the EAP peer and the EAP
authenticator. The AVP data is of type OctetString.		authenticator. The AVP data is of type OctetString.
8.6. Failed-AVP AVP		8.4. Failed-AVP AVP
The Failed-AVP AVP (AVP Code 6) provides debugging information in		The Failed-AVP AVP (AVP Code 4) provides debugging information in
cases where a request is rejected or not fully processed due to		cases where a message is rejected or not fully processed due to
erroneous information in a specific AVP. The AVP data is of type		erroneous information in a specific AVP. The AVP data is of type
Grouped. The format of the Failed-AVP AVP is defined in [RFC3588].		Grouped. The format of the Failed-AVP AVP using the ABNF grammar
		defined in [RFC3588] for Grouped AVP is as follows.
		<Failed-AVP> ::= < AVP Header: 4 >
		1* {AVP}
In case of a failed grouped AVP, the Failed-AVP contains the whole		In case of a failed grouped AVP, the Failed-AVP contains the whole
grouped AVP. In case of a failed AVP inside a grouped AVP, the		grouped AVP. In case of a failed AVP inside a grouped AVP, the
Failed-AVP contains the single offending AVP.		Failed-AVP contains the single offending AVP.
8.7. ISP-Information AVP		8.5. Failed-Message-Header AVP
The ISP-Information AVP (AVP Code 7) contains zero or one Provider-
Identifier AVP which carries the identifier of the ISP and one
Provider-Name AVP which carries the name of the ISP. The AVP data is
of type Grouped, and it has the following ABNF grammar:
ISP-Information ::= < AVP Header: 7 >
0*1 { Provider-Identifier }
{ Provider-Name }
* [ AVP ]
8.8. Key-Id AVP
The Key-Id AVP (AVP Code 8) is of type Integer32, and contains an
AAA-Key identifier. The AAA-Key identifier is assigned by PAA and
MUST be unique within the PANA session.
8.9. NAP-Information AVP		The Failed-Message-Header AVP (AVP Code 5) provides debugging
		information in cases where a message is rejected or not fully
		processed due to erroneous information in the message. The AVP data
		is of type OctetString. The AVP data contains the 16-octet header of
		the message that caused the error.
The NAP-Information AVP (AVP Code 9) contains zero or one Provider-		8.6. Key-Id AVP
Identifier AVP which carries the identifier of the NAP and one
Provider-Name AVP which carries the name of the NAP. The AVP data is
of type Grouped, and it has the following ABNF grammar:
NAP-Information ::= < AVP Header: 9 >		The Key-Id AVP (AVP Code 6) is of type Integer32, and contains an MSK
0*1 { Provider-Identifier }		identifier. The MSK identifier is assigned by PAA and MUST be unique
{ Provider-Name }		within the PANA session.
* [ AVP ]
8.10. Nonce AVP		8.7. Nonce AVP
The Nonce AVP (AVP Code 10) carries a randomly chosen value that is		The Nonce AVP (AVP Code 7) carries a randomly chosen value that is
used in cryptographic key computations. The recommendations in		used in cryptographic key computations. The recommendations in
[RFC4086] apply with regard to generation of random values. The AVP		[RFC4086] apply with regard to generation of random values. The AVP
data is of type OctetString and it contains a randomly generated		data is of type OctetString and it contains a randomly generated
value in opaque format. The data length MUST be between 8 and 256		value in opaque format. The data length MUST be between 8 and 256
octets inclusive.		octets inclusive.
The length of the nonces are determined based on the available		The length of the nonces are determined based on the available
pseudo-random functions (PRFs) and the degree of trust placed into		pseudo-random functions (PRFs) and the degree of trust placed into
the two PaC and the PAA to compute random values. The length of the		the two PaC and the PAA to compute random values. The length of the
random value for the nonce is determined whether		random value for the nonce is determined whether
Skipping to change at page 53, line 11:
computation a random nonce (according to [RFC4086]). The length		computation a random nonce (according to [RFC4086]). The length
of the nonce has to have the full length of the PRF key (e.g., 20		of the nonce has to have the full length of the PRF key (e.g., 20
octets in the case of HMAC-SHA1).		octets in the case of HMAC-SHA1).
Furthermore, the strongest available PRF available for PANA has to be		Furthermore, the strongest available PRF available for PANA has to be
considered in this computation. Currently, only a single PRF (namely		considered in this computation. Currently, only a single PRF (namely
HMAC-SHA1) is available and therefore the maximum output length is 20		HMAC-SHA1) is available and therefore the maximum output length is 20
octets). The recommended maximum length of the nonce value is		octets). The recommended maximum length of the nonce value is
therefore currently 20 octets.		therefore currently 20 octets.
8.11. Notification AVP		8.8. Result-Code AVP
The Notification AVP (AVP Code 11) is optionally used to convey a
displayable message sent by either the PaC or the PAA. It can be
included in any message, whether it is a request or answer. In case
a notification needs to be sent but there is no outgoing PANA message
to deliver this AVP, a PANA-Update-Request that only carries a
Notification AVP SHOULD be generated.
The 'M' bit in the AVP header of this AVP MUST NOT be set.
Receipt this AVP does not change PANA state.
AVP data is of type OctetString and it contains the following fields
in the listed order:
Language Tag Length
This field contains the length of the Language Tag in octets. The
length of this field is 2 octets.
Language Tag
This field contains the language tag defined in [I-D.ietf-ltru-
registry] to indicate the language used for Displayable String.
The length of this data is determined by the Language Tag Length
field.
Displayable String
This field contains UTF-8 encoded ISO 10646 characters [RFC2279]
using the language indicated by the Language Tag. The length of
this data is determined by the AVP Length field and the Language
Tag Length field. This data MUST NOT be null terminated.
8.12. Post-PANA-Address-Configuration (PPAC) AVP
The PPAC AVP (AVP Code 12) is used for conveying the available types
of post-PANA IP address configuration mechanisms when sent by the
PAA, and the chosen one when sent by the PaC. Each possible
mechanisms is represented by a flag. The AVP data is of type
Unsigned32.
The format of the AVP data is as follows:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|N|F|S|A|T|I| Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
PPAC Flags
N (No configuration)
The PaC does not have to (if sent by PAA) or will not (if sent
by PaC) configure a new IP address after PANA.
F (DHCPv4)
The PaC can (if sent by PAA) or will (if sent by PaC) use
DHCPv4 [RFC2131] to configure a new IPv4 address after PANA.
S (DHCPv6)
The PaC can (if sent by PAA) or will (if sent by PaC) use
DHCPv6 [RFC3315] to configure a new IPv4 address after PANA.
A (stateless autoconfiguration)
The PaC can/will use stateless IPv6 address autoconfiguration
[RFC2462] to configure a new IPv6 address after PANA.
T (DHCPv4 with IPsec tunnel mode)
The PaC can/will use [RFC3456] to configure a new IPv4 address
after PANA.
I (IKEv2)
The PaC can/will use [RFC4306] to configure (a) new IPv4 and/or
IPv6 address(es) after PANA.
Reserved
These flag bits are reserved for future use, and MUST be set to
zero, and ignored by the receiver.
The PAA MUST set either the N-flag, or one or more of the other
flags. If the N-flag is set, the PaC MUST only set its N-flag in its
response. If the N-flag is not set by the PAA, that means the PaC
MUST configure POPA(s) using the method(s) indicated by the flags.
If IPsec-based access control is not used, the F-flag, S-flag or
A-flag MUST be set by the PAA, and the PaC MUST echo the same flag(s)
in its response. Refer to [I-D.ietf-pana-framework] for a detailed
discussion on when these methods can be used.
8.13. Protection-Capability AVP
The Protection-Capability AVP (AVP Code 13) indicates the
cryptographic data protection capability supported and required by
the EPs. The AVP data is of type Unsigned32. Below is a list of
valid data values and associated protection capabilities:
0 L2_PROTECTION
1 IPSEC_PROTECTION
8.14. Provider-Identifier AVP
The Provider-Identifier AVP (AVP Code 14) is of type Unsigned32, and
contains an IANA assigned "SMI Network Management Private Enterprise
Codes" [ianaweb] value, encoded in network byte order.
8.15. Provider-Name AVP
The Provider-Name AVP (AVP Code 15) is of type UTF8String, and
contains the UTF8-encoded name of the provider.
8.16. Result-Code AVP
The Result-Code AVP (AVP Code 16) is of type Unsigned32 and indicates		The Result-Code AVP (AVP Code 8) is of type Unsigned32 and indicates
whether an EAP authentication was completed successfully or whether		whether an EAP authentication was completed successfully or whether
an error occurred. Here are Result-Code AVP values taken from		an error occurred. Result-Code AVP values are described in the
[RFC3588] and adapted for PANA.		subsequent sections.
8.16.1. Authentication Results Codes		8.8.1. Authentication Results Codes
These result code values inform the PaC about the authentication and		These result code values inform the PaC about the authentication and
authorization result. The authentication result and authorization		authorization result. The authentication result and authorization
result can be different as described below, but only one result is		result can be different as described below, but only one result is
returned to the PaC. These codes are used with PANA-Bind-Request and		returned to the PaC. These codes are used with PANA-Bind-Request
PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request messages.		message.
PANA_SUCCESS 2001		PANA_SUCCESS 0
Both authentication and authorization processes are successful.		Both authentication and authorization processes are successful.
PANA_AUTHENTICATION_REJECTED 4001		PANA_AUTHENTICATION_REJECTED 1
Authentication has failed. When this error is returned, it is		Authentication has failed. When this error is returned, it is
assumed that authorization is automatically failed.		assumed that authorization is automatically failed.
PANA_AUTHORIZATION_REJECTED 5003		PANA_AUTHORIZATION_REJECTED 2
The authorization process has failed. This error could occur when		The authorization process has failed. This error could occur when
authorization is rejected by a AAA server or rejected locally by a		authorization is rejected by a AAA server or rejected locally by a
PAA, even if the authentication procedure has succeeded.		PAA, even if the authentication procedure has succeeded.
8.16.2. Protocol Error Result Codes		8.8.2. Protocol Error Result Codes
These codes are used with PANA-Error-Request messages. Unless stated		These codes are used with PANA-Error-Request messages. Unless stated
otherwise, they can be generated by both the PaC and the PAA.		otherwise, they can be generated by both the PaC and the PAA.
PANA_MESSAGE_UNSUPPORTED 3001		PANA_MESSAGE_UNSUPPORTED 1001
Message type not recognized or supported.		Message type not recognized or supported.
PANA_UNABLE_TO_DELIVER 3002		PANA_UNABLE_TO_DELIVER 1002
The PAA was unable to deliver the EAP payload to the		The PAA was unable to deliver the EAP payload to the
authentication server. Only the PAA can generate this code.		authentication server. Only the PAA can generate this code.
PANA_INVALID_HDR_BITS 3008		PANA_INVALID_HDR_BITS 1003
A message was received whose bits in the PANA header were either		A message was received whose bits in the PANA message header were
set to an invalid combination, or to a value that is inconsistent		either set to an invalid combination, or to a value that is
with the message type definition.		inconsistent with the message type definition.
PANA_INVALID_AVP_FLAGS 3009		PANA_INVALID_AVP_FLAGS 1004
A message was received that included an AVP whose flag bits are		A message was received that included an AVP whose flag bits are
set to an unrecognized value, or that is inconsistent with the		set to an unrecognized value, or that is inconsistent with the
AVP's definition.		AVP's definition.
PANA_AVP_UNSUPPORTED 5001		PANA_AVP_UNSUPPORTED 1005
The received message contained an AVP that is not recognized or		The received message contained an AVP that is not recognized or
supported and was marked with the Mandatory bit. A PANA message		supported and was marked with the Mandatory bit. A PANA message
with this error MUST contain one or more Failed-AVP AVP containing		with this error MUST contain one or more Failed-AVP AVP containing
the AVPs that caused the failure.		the AVPs that caused the failure.
PANA_UNKNOWN_SESSION_ID 5002		PANA_INVALID_AVP_DATA 1006
The message contained an unknown Session-Id. A PANA message
indicating this error MUST include the unknown Session-Id AVP
within a Failed-AVP AVP.
PANA_INVALID_AVP_DATA 5004
The message contained an AVP with an invalid value in its data		The message contained an AVP with an invalid value in its data
portion. A PANA message indicating this error MUST include the		portion. A PANA message indicating this error MUST include the
offending AVPs within a Failed-AVP AVP.		offending AVPs within a Failed-AVP AVP.
PANA_MISSING_AVP 5005		PANA_MISSING_AVP 1007
The message did not contain an AVP that is required by the message		The message did not contain an AVP that is required by the message
type definition. If this value is sent in the Result-Code AVP, a		type definition. If this value is sent in the Result-Code AVP, a
Failed-AVP AVP SHOULD be included in the message. The Failed-AVP		Failed-AVP AVP SHOULD be included in the message. The Failed-AVP
AVP MUST contain an example of the missing AVP complete with the		AVP MUST contain an example of the missing AVP complete with the
Vendor-Id if applicable. The value field of the missing AVP		Vendor-Id if applicable. The value field of the missing AVP
should be of correct minimum length and contain zeroes.		should be of correct minimum length and contain zeroes.
PANA_RESOURCES_EXCEEDED 5006		PANA_RESOURCES_EXCEEDED 1008
A message was received that cannot be authorized because the		A message was received that cannot be authorized because the
client has already expended allowed resources. An example of this		client has already expended allowed resources. An example of this
error condition is a client that is restricted to one PANA session		error condition is a client that is restricted to one PANA session
and attempts to establish a second session. Only the PAA can		and attempts to establish a second session. Only the PAA can
generate this code.		generate this code.
PANA_CONTRADICTING_AVPS 5007		PANA_CONTRADICTING_AVPS 1009
The PAA has detected AVPs in the message that contradicted each		The PAA has detected AVPs in the message that contradicted each
other, and is not willing to provide service to the client. One		other, and is not willing to provide service to the client. One
or more Failed-AVP AVPs MUST be present, containing the AVPs that		or more Failed-AVP AVPs MUST be present, containing the AVPs that
contradicted each other. Only the PAA can generate this code.		contradicted each other. Only the PAA can generate this code.
PANA_AVP_NOT_ALLOWED 5008		PANA_AVP_NOT_ALLOWED 1010
A message was received with an AVP that MUST NOT be present. The		A message was received with an AVP that MUST NOT be present. The
Failed-AVP AVP MUST be included and contain a copy of the		Failed-AVP AVP MUST be included and contain a copy of the
offending AVP.		offending AVP.
PANA_AVP_OCCURS_TOO_MANY_TIMES 5009		PANA_AVP_OCCURS_TOO_MANY_TIMES 1011
A message was received that included an AVP that appeared more		A message was received that included an AVP that appeared more
often than permitted in the message definition. The Failed-AVP		often than permitted in the message definition. The Failed-AVP
AVP MUST be included and contain a copy of the first instance of		AVP MUST be included and contain a copy of the first instance of
the offending AVP that exceeded the maximum number of occurrences.		the offending AVP that exceeded the maximum number of occurrences.
PANA_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION 5011		PANA_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION 1012
This error is returned when a message was received, whose version		This error is returned when a message was received, whose version
number is unsupported.		number is unsupported.
PANA_UNABLE_TO_COMPLY 5012		PANA_UNABLE_TO_COMPLY 1013
This error is returned when a request is rejected for unspecified		This error is returned when a request is rejected for unspecified
reasons. For example, when an EAP authentication fails at an EAP		reasons. For example, when an EAP authentication fails at an EAP
pass-through authenticator without passing an EAP Failure message		pass-through authenticator without passing an EAP Failure message
to the PAA, a Result-Code AVP with this error code is carried in		to the PAA, a Result-Code AVP with this error code is carried in
the PANA-Error-Request message.		the PANA-Error-Request message.
PANA_INVALID_AVP_LENGTH 5014		PANA_INVALID_AVP_LENGTH 1014
The message contained an AVP with an invalid length. The PANA-		The message contained an AVP with an invalid length. The
Error-Request message indicating this error MUST include the		PANA-Error-Request message indicating this error MUST include the
offending AVPs within a Failed-AVP AVP.		offending AVPs within a Failed-AVP AVP.
PANA_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH 5015		PANA_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH 1015
This error is returned when a message is received with an invalid		This error is returned when a message is received with an invalid
message length.		message length.
PANA_PROTECTION_CAPABILITY_UNSUPPORTED 5016		8.9. Session-Lifetime AVP
This error is returned when the PaC receives a PANA-Bind-Request
message with a Protection-Capability AVP and a valid AUTH AVP but
does not support the protection capability specified in the
Protection-Capability AVP. Only the PaC can generate this code.
PANA_PPAC_CAPABILITY_UNSUPPORTED 5017
This error is returned when there is no match between the list of
PPAC methods offered by the PAA and the ones available on the PaC.
Only the PaC can generate this code.
8.17. Session-Id AVP
All messages pertaining to a specific PANA session MUST include a
Session-Id AVP (AVP Code 17) which carries a PAA-assigned fixed
session identifier value throughout the lifetime of a session. When
present, the Session-Id AVP MUST appear immediately following the
PANA header.
The Session-Id MUST be globally and eternally unique, as it is meant
to identify a PANA session without reference to any other
information, and may be needed to correlate historical authentication
information with accounting information. The PANA Session-Id AVP has
the same format as the Diameter Session-Id AVP [RFC3588].
8.18. Session-Lifetime AVP
The Session-Lifetime AVP (AVP Code 18) contains the number of seconds		The Session-Lifetime AVP (AVP Code 9) contains the number of seconds
remaining before the current session is considered expired. The AVP		remaining before the current session is considered expired. The AVP
data is of type Unsigned32.		data is of type Unsigned32.
8.19. Termination-Cause AVP		8.10. Termination-Cause AVP
The Termination-Cause AVP (AVP Code 19) is used for indicating the		The Termination-Cause AVP (AVP Code 10) is used for indicating the
reason why a session is terminated by the requester. The AVP data is		reason why a session is terminated by the requester. The AVP data is
of type Enumerated. The following Termination-Cause data values are		of type Enumerated. The following Termination-Cause data values are
used with PANA.		used with PANA.
LOGOUT 1 (PaC -> PAA)		LOGOUT 1 (PaC -> PAA)
The client initiated a disconnect		The client initiated a disconnect
ADMINISTRATIVE 4 (PAA -> PaC)		ADMINISTRATIVE 4 (PAA -> PaC)
The client was not granted access, or was disconnected, due to		The client was not granted access, or was disconnected, due to
administrative reasons.		administrative reasons.
SESSION_TIMEOUT 8 (PAA -> PaC)		SESSION_TIMEOUT 8 (PAA -> PaC)
The session has timed out, and service has been terminated.		The session has timed out, and service has been terminated.
9. Retransmission Timers		9. Retransmission Timers
The PANA protocol provides retransmissions for the PANA-PAA-Discover		The PANA protocol provides retransmissions for the
message and all request messages, with the exception that the PANA-		PANA-Client-Initiation message and all request messages.
Start-Answer message is retransmitted instead of the PANA-Start-
Request message in stateless PAA discovery.
PANA retransmission timers are based on the model used in DHCPv6		PANA retransmission timers are based on the model used in DHCPv6
[RFC3315]. Variables used here are also borrowed from this		[RFC3315]. Variables used here are also borrowed from this
specification. PANA is a request response like protocol. The		specification. PANA is a request response like protocol. The
message exchange terminates when either the request sender		message exchange terminates when the request sender successfully
successfully receives the appropriate answer, or when the message		receives the appropriate answer, or when a protected
exchange is considered to have failed according to the retransmission		PANA-Error-Request message for the request is received, or when the
mechanism described below.		message exchange is considered to have failed according to the
		retransmission mechanism described below.
The retransmission behavior is controlled and described by the		The retransmission behavior is controlled and described by the
following variables:		following variables:
RT Retransmission timeout		RT Retransmission timeout
IRT Initial retransmission time		IRT Initial retransmission time
MRC Maximum retransmission count		MRC Maximum retransmission count
Skipping to change at page 61, line 35:
If both MRC and MRD are non-zero, the message exchange fails whenever		If both MRC and MRD are non-zero, the message exchange fails whenever
either of the conditions specified in the previous two paragraphs are		either of the conditions specified in the previous two paragraphs are
met.		met.
If both MRC and MRD are zero, the client continues to transmit the		If both MRC and MRD are zero, the client continues to transmit the
message until it receives a response.		message until it receives a response.
9.1. Transmission and Retransmission Parameters		9.1. Transmission and Retransmission Parameters
This section presents a table of values used to describe the message		This section presents a table of values used to describe the message
retransmission behavior of PANA requests and answers that are		retransmission behavior of PANA requests that are retransmitted
retransmitted (REQ_*) and PANA-PAA-Discover message (PDI_*). The		(REQ_*) and PANA-Client-Initiation message (PCI_*). The table shows
table shows default values.		default values.
Parameter Default Description		Parameter Default Description
------------------------------------------------		------------------------------------------------
PDI_IRT 1 sec Initial PDI timeout.		PCI_IRT 1 sec Initial PCI timeout.
PDI_MRT 120 secs Max PDI timeout value.		PCI_MRT 120 secs Max PCI timeout value.
PDI_MRC 0 Configurable.		PCI_MRC 0 Configurable.
PDI_MRD 0 Configurable.		PCI_MRD 0 Configurable.
REQ_IRT 1 sec Initial Request timeout.		REQ_IRT 1 sec Initial Request timeout.
REQ_MRT 30 secs Max Request timeout value.		REQ_MRT 30 secs Max Request timeout value.
REQ_MRC 10 Max Request retry attempts.		REQ_MRC 10 Max Request retry attempts.
REQ_MRD 0 Configurable.		REQ_MRD 0 Configurable.
So for example the first RT for the PBR message is calculated using		So for example the first RT for the PBR message is calculated using
REQ_IRT as the IRT:		REQ_IRT as the IRT:
RT = REQ_IRT + RAND*REQ_IRT		RT = REQ_IRT + RAND*REQ_IRT
Skipping to change at page 63, line 35:
publish a notice of the decision to the PANA WG mailing list or its		publish a notice of the decision to the PANA WG mailing list or its
successor. A denial notice must be justified by an explanation and,		successor. A denial notice must be justified by an explanation and,
in the cases where it is possible, concrete suggestions on how the		in the cases where it is possible, concrete suggestions on how the
request can be modified so as to become acceptable.		request can be modified so as to become acceptable.
10.1. PANA UDP Port Number		10.1. PANA UDP Port Number
PANA uses one well-known UDP port number (Section 4.1, Section 4.3		PANA uses one well-known UDP port number (Section 4.1, Section 4.3
and Section 6.1), which needs to be assigned by the IANA.		and Section 6.1), which needs to be assigned by the IANA.
10.2. PANA Multicast Address		10.2. PANA Message Header
PANA uses one well-known administratively scoped IPv4 multicast		As defined in Section 6.2, the PANA message header contains two
address, and one well-known administratively scoped IPv6 multicast		fields that requires IANA namespace management; the Version, Message
address (Section 4.3 and Section 6.1), which need to be assigned by		Type and Flags fields.
the IANA.
10.3. PANA Header		10.2.1. Version
As defined in Section 6.2, the PANA header contains two fields that		The Version namespace is used to identify PANA versions. The Version
requires IANA namespace management; the Message Type and Flags field.		values are assigned by Standards Action [IANA]. This document
		defines the Version 1.
10.3.1. Message Type		10.2.2. Message Type
The Message Type namespace is used to identify PANA messages. Values		The Message Type namespace is used to identify PANA messages. Values
0-65,533 are for permanent, standard message types, allocated by IETF		0-65,519 are for permanent, standard message types, allocated by IETF
Consensus [IANA]. This document defines the Message Types 1-10. See		Consensus [IANA]. This document defines the Message Types 1-9. See
Section 7.1 through Section 7.19 for the assignment of the namespace		Section 7.1 through Section 7.17 for the assignment of the namespace
in this specification.		in this specification.
The values 65,534 and 65,535 (hexadecimal values 0xfffe - 0xffff) are		The values 65,520 and 65,535 (hexadecimal values 0xfff0 - 0xffff) are
reserved for experimental messages. As these codes are only for		reserved for experimental messages. As these codes are only for
experimental and testing purposes, no guarantee is made for		experimental and testing purposes, no guarantee is made for
interoperability between the communicating PaC and PAA using		interoperability between the communicating PaC and PAA using
experimental commands, as outlined in [IANA-EXP].		experimental commands, as outlined in [IANA-EXP].
10.3.2. Flags		10.2.3. Flags
There are 16 bits in the Flags field of the PANA header. This		There are 16 bits in the Flags field of the PANA message header.
document assigns bit 0 ('R'equest), bit 1 ('S'eparate) and bit 2		This document assigns bit 0 ('R'equest). The remaining bits MUST
('N'AP Authentication). The remaining bits MUST only be assigned via		only be assigned via a Standards Action [IANA].
a Standards Action [IANA].
10.4. AVP Header		10.3. AVP Header
As defined in Section 6.3, the AVP header contains three fields that		As defined in Section 6.3, the AVP header contains three fields that
requires IANA namespace management; the AVP Code, AVP Flags and		requires IANA namespace management; the AVP Code, AVP Flags and
Vendor-Id fields where only the AVP Code and AVP Flags create new		Vendor-Id fields where only the AVP Code and AVP Flags create new
namespaces.		namespaces.
10.4.1. AVP Code		10.3.1. AVP Code
The AVP Code namespace is used to identify attributes. There are		The 16-bit AVP Code namespace is used to identify attributes. There
multiple namespaces. Vendors can have their own AVP Codes namespace		are multiple namespaces. Vendors can have their own AVP Codes
which will be identified by their Vendor-ID (also known as		namespace which will be identified by their Vendor-ID (also known as
Enterprise-Number) and they control the assignments of their vendor-		Enterprise-Number) and they control the assignments of their
specific AVP codes within their own namespace. The absence of a		vendor-specific AVP codes within their own namespace. The absence of
Vendor-ID or a Vendor-ID value of zero (0) identifies the IETF IANA		a Vendor-ID identifies the IETF IANA controlled AVP Codes namespace.
controlled AVP Codes namespace. The AVP Codes and sometimes also		The AVP Codes and sometimes also possible values in an AVP are
possible values in an AVP are controlled and maintained by IANA.		controlled and maintained by IANA.
AVP Code 0 is not used. This document defines the AVP Codes 1-19.		AVP Code 0 is not used. This document defines the AVP Codes 1-10.
See Section 8.1 through Section 8.19 for the assignment of the		See Section 8.1 through Section 8.10 for the assignment of the
namespace in this specification.		namespace in this specification.
AVPs may be allocated following Designated Expert with Specification		AVPs may be allocated following Designated Expert with Specification
Required [IANA]. Release of blocks of AVPs (more than 3 at a time		Required [IANA] or Standards Action. AVPs with 'M' bit set MUST be
for a given purpose) should require IETF Consensus.		allocated by Standards Action.
Note that PANA defines a mechanism for Vendor-Specific AVPs, where		Note that PANA defines a mechanism for Vendor-Specific AVPs, where
the Vendor-Id field in the AVP header is set to a non-zero value.		the Vendor-Id field in the AVP header is set to a non-zero value.
Vendor-Specific AVPs codes are for Private Use and should be		Vendor-Specific AVPs codes are for Private Use and should be
encouraged instead of allocation of global attribute types, for		encouraged instead of allocation of global attribute types, for
functions specific only to one vendor's implementation of PANA, where		functions specific only to one vendor's implementation of PANA, where
no interoperability is deemed useful. Where a Vendor-Specific AVP is		no interoperability is deemed useful. Where a Vendor-Specific AVP is
implemented by more than one vendor, allocation of global AVPs should		implemented by more than one vendor, allocation of global AVPs should
be encouraged instead.		be encouraged instead.
10.4.2. Flags		10.3.2. Flags
There are 16 bits in the AVP Flags field of the AVP header, defined		There are 16 bits in the AVP Flags field of the AVP header, defined
in Section 6.3. This document assigns bit 0 ('V'endor Specific) and		in Section 6.3. This document assigns bit 0 ('V'endor Specific) and
bit 1 ('M'andatory). The remaining bits should only be assigned via		bit 1 ('M'andatory). The remaining bits should only be assigned via
a Standards Action .		a Standards Action .
10.5. AVP Values		10.4. AVP Values
Certain AVPs in PANA define a list of values with various meanings.		Certain AVPs in PANA define a list of values with various meanings.
For attributes other than those specified in this section, adding		For attributes other than those specified in this section, adding
additional values to the list can be done on a First Come, First		additional values to the list can be done on a First Come, First
Served basis by IANA [IANA].		Served basis by IANA [IANA].
10.5.1. Post-PANA-Address-Configuration AVP Values		10.4.1. Result-Code AVP Values
As defined in Section 8.12, the Post-PANA-Address-Configuration AVP
(AVP Code 12) defines the bits 0 ('N': no configuration), 1 ('F':
DHCPv4), 2 ('S': DHCPv6), 3 ('A' stateless autoconfiguration), 4
('T': DHCPv4 with IPsec tunnel mode) and 5 ('I': IKEv2).
All remaining values are available for assignment via a Standards
Action [IANA].
10.5.2. Protection-Capability AVP Values
As defined in Section 8.13, the Protection-Capability AVP (AVP Code
13) defines the values 0 and 1.
All remaining values are available for assignment via a Standards
Action [IANA].
10.5.3. Result-Code AVP Values
As defined in Section 8.16.1 and Section 8.16.2 the Result-Code AVP		As defined in Section 8.8.1 and Section 8.8.2 the Result-Code AVP
(AVP Code 16) defines the values 2001, 3001-3002, 3008-3009, 4001,		(AVP Code 8) defines the values 0-3 and 1001-1015.
5001-5009 and 5011-5017.
All remaining values are available for assignment via IETF Consensus		All remaining values are available for assignment via IETF Consensus
[IANA].		[IANA].
10.5.4. Termination-Cause AVP Values		10.4.2. Termination-Cause AVP Values
As defined in Section 8.19, the Termination-Cause AVP (AVP Code 19)		As defined in Section 8.10, the Termination-Cause AVP (AVP Code 10)
defines the values 1, 4 and 8.		defines the values 1, 4 and 8.
All remaining values are available for assignment via IETF Consensus		All remaining values are available for assignment via IETF Consensus
[IANA].		[IANA].
11. Security Considerations		11. Security Considerations
The PANA protocol defines a UDP-based EAP encapsulation that runs		The PANA protocol defines a UDP-based EAP encapsulation that runs
between two IP-enabled nodes on the same IP link. Various security		between two IP-enabled nodes on the same IP link. Various security
threats that are relevant to a protocol of this nature are outlined		threats that are relevant to a protocol of this nature are outlined
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The PANA framework defines EP which is ideally located on a network		The PANA framework defines EP which is ideally located on a network
device that can filter traffic from the PaCs before the traffic		device that can filter traffic from the PaCs before the traffic
enters the Internet/intranet. A set of filters can be used to		enters the Internet/intranet. A set of filters can be used to
discard unauthorized packets, such as a PANA-Start-Request message		discard unauthorized packets, such as a PANA-Start-Request message
that is received from the segment of the access network where only		that is received from the segment of the access network where only
the PaCs are supposed to be connected.		the PaCs are supposed to be connected.
The protocol also provides authentication and integrity protection to		The protocol also provides authentication and integrity protection to
PANA messages when the used EAP method can generate cryptographic		PANA messages when the used EAP method can generate cryptographic
session keys. A PANA SA is generated based on the AAA-Key exported		session keys. A PANA SA is generated based on the MSK exported by
by the EAP method. This SA is used for generating an AUTH AVP to		the EAP method. This SA is used for generating an AUTH AVP to
protect the PANA header and payload (including the complete EAP		protect the PANA message header and payload (including the complete
message).		EAP message).
The cryptographic protection prevents an adversary from acting as a		The cryptographic protection prevents an adversary from acting as a
man-in-the-middle, injecting messages, replaying messages and		man-in-the-middle, injecting messages, replaying messages and
modifying the content of the exchanged messages. Any packet that		modifying the content of the exchanged messages. Any packet that
fails to pass the AUTH verification is silently discarded. The		fails to pass the AUTH verification is silently discarded. The
earliest this protection can be enabled is when the very first PANA-		earliest this protection can be enabled is when the very first
Bind-Request or PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request message that signals a		PANA-Bind-Request message that signals a successful authentication is
successful authentication is generated. Starting with these		generated. Starting with these messages, any subsequent PANA message
messages, any subsequent PANA message until the session gets torn		until the session gets torn down can be cryptographically protected.
down can be cryptographically protected.
The PANA SA enables authenticated and integrity protected exchange of
the device ID information between the PaC and PAA. This ensures
there were no man-in-the-middle during the PANA authentication.
The lifetime of the PANA SA is set to PANA session lifetime which is		The lifetime of the PANA SA is set to PANA session lifetime which is
bounded by the authorization lifetime granted by the authentication		bounded by the authorization lifetime granted by the authentication
server. An implementation MAY add a tolerance period to that value.		server. An implementation MAY add a tolerance period to that value.
Unless the PANA session is extended by executing another EAP		Unless the PANA session is extended by executing another EAP
authentication, the PANA SA is removed when the current session		authentication, the PANA SA is removed when the current session
expires.		expires.
The ability to use cryptographic protection within PANA is determined		The ability to use cryptographic protection within PANA is determined
by the used EAP method, which is generally dictated by the deployment		by the used EAP method, which is generally dictated by the deployment
environment. Insecure lower-layers necessitate use of key-generating		environment. Insecure lower-layers necessitate use of key-generating
EAP methods. In networks where lower-layers are already secured,		EAP methods. In networks where lower-layers are already secured,
cryptographic protection of PANA messages is not necessary.		cryptographic protection of PANA messages is not necessary.
11.2. Discovery		11.2. Handshake
The discovery and handshake phase is vulnerable to spoofing attacks		The handshake phase is vulnerable to spoofing attacks as these
as these messages are not authenticated and integrity protected. In		messages are not authenticated and integrity protected. In order to
order to prevent very basic denial-of service attacks an adversary		prevent very basic denial-of service attacks an adversary should not
should not be able to cause state creation by sending discovery		be able to cause state creation by sending PANA-Client-Initiation
messages to the PAA. This protection is achieved by using a cookie-		messages to the PAA. This protection is achieved by allowing the
based scheme (similar to [RFC2522] which allows the responder (PAA)		responder (PAA) to create as less amount of state as possible in the
to be stateless in the first round of message exchange. However, it		first round of message exchange. However, it is difficult to prevent
is difficult to prevent all spoofing attacks in the discovery and		all spoofing attacks in the handshake phase entirely.
handshake phase entirely.
In networks where lower-layers are not secured prior to running PANA,		In networks where lower-layers are not secured prior to running PANA,
the capability discovery enabled through inclusion of Protection-		the capability discovery enabled through inclusion of an Algorithm
Capability and Post-PANA-Address-Configuration AVPs in a PANA-Start-		AVP in a PANA-Start-Request message is susceptible to spoofing
Request message is susceptible to spoofing leading to denial-of		leading to denial-of service attacks. Therefore, usage of this AVP
service attacks. Therefore, usage of these AVPs during the discovery		during the handshake phase in such insecure networks is NOT
and handshake phase in such insecure networks is NOT RECOMMENDED.		RECOMMENDED. The same AVP is delivered via an integrity-protected
The same AVPs are delivered via an integrity-protected PANA-Bind-		PANA-Bind-Request upon successful authentication.
Request upon successful authentication.
11.3. EAP Methods		11.3. EAP Methods
Eavesdropping EAP messages might cause problems when the EAP method		Eavesdropping EAP messages might cause problems when the EAP method
is weak and enables dictionary or replay attacks or even allows an		is weak and enables dictionary or replay attacks or even allows an
adversary to learn the long-term password directly. Furthermore, if		adversary to learn the long-term password directly. Furthermore, if
the optional EAP Response/Identity payload is used then it allows the		the optional EAP Response/Identity payload is used then it allows the
adversary to learn the identity of the PaC. In such a case a privacy		adversary to learn the identity of the PaC. In such a case a privacy
problem is prevalent.		problem is prevalent.
To prevent these threats, [I-D.ietf-pana-framework] suggests using		To prevent these threats, [I-D.ietf-pana-framework] suggests using
proper EAP methods for particular environments. Depending on the		proper EAP methods for particular environments. Depending on the
deployment environment an EAP authentication method which supports		deployment environment an EAP authentication method which supports
user identity confidentiality, protection against dictionary attacks		user identity confidentiality, protection against dictionary attacks
and session key establishment must be used. It is therefore the		and session key establishment must be used. It is therefore the
responsibility of the network operators and users to choose a proper		responsibility of the network operators and users to choose a proper
EAP method.		EAP method.
11.4. Separate NAP and ISP Authentication		11.4. Cryptographic Keys
The PANA design allows running two separate EAP sessions for the same
PaC in the authentication and authorization phase: one with the NAP,
and one with the ISP. The process of arriving at the resultant
authorization, which is a combination of the individual
authorizations obtained from respective service providers, is outside
the scope of this protocol. In the absence of lower-layer security,
both authentications MUST be able to generate a AAA-Key, leading to
generation of a PANA SA. The resultant PANA SA cryptographically
binds the two AAA-Keys together, hence it prevents man-in-the-middle
attacks.
11.5. Cryptographic Keys
When the EAP method exports a AAA-Key, this key is used to produce a		When the EAP method exports an MSK, this key is used to produce a
PANA SA with PANA_AUTH_KEY with a distinct key ID. The PANA_AUTH_KEY		PANA SA with PANA_AUTH_KEY with a distinct key ID. The PANA_AUTH_KEY
is unique to the PANA session, and takes PANA-based nonce values into		is unique to the PANA session, and takes PANA-based nonce values into
computation to cryptographically separate itself from the AAA-Key.		computation to cryptographically separate itself from the MSK.
The PANA_AUTH_KEY is solely used for authentication and integrity		The PANA_AUTH_KEY is solely used for authentication and integrity
protection of the PANA messages within the designated session.		protection of the PANA messages within the designated session.
Two AAA-Keys may be generated as a result of separate NAP and ISP		The PANA SA lifetime is bounded by the MSK lifetime. Another
authentication. In that case, the AAA-Key used with the PANA SA is		execution of EAP method yields in a new MSK, and updates the PANA SA,
the combination of both keys.		PANA_AUTH_KEY and key ID.
The PANA SA lifetime is bounded by the AAA-Key lifetime. Another
execution of EAP method yields in a new AAA-Key, and updates the PANA
SA, PANA_AUTH_KEY and key ID.
When link-layer or network-layer ciphering [I-D.ietf-pana-ipsec] is
enabled as a result of successful PANA authentication, a PaC-EP-
Master-Key is generated for each EP from the AAA-Key, session
identifier, key identifier, and the EP device identifier. The PaC-
EP-Master-Key derivation algorithm defined in Section 5.6 ensures
cryptographic independency among different PaC-EP-Master-Keys.
The lifetime of PaC-EP master key is bounded by the lifetime of the
PANA SA. This key may be used with a secure association protocol
[RFC4306] to produce further cipher-specific and transient keys.
11.6. Per-packet Ciphering		11.5. Per-packet Ciphering
Networks that are not secured at the lower-layers prior to running		Networks that are not secured at the lower-layers prior to running
PANA can rely on enabling per-packet data traffic ciphering upon		PANA can rely on enabling per-packet data traffic ciphering upon
successful PANA session establishment. The PANA framework allows		successful PANA SA establishment. The PANA framework allows
generation of a PaC-EP master key from AAA-Key for using with a per-		generation of cryptographic keys from the PANA SA and use the keys
packet protection mechanism, such as link-layer or IPsec-based		with a secure association protocol to enable per-packet cryptographic
ciphering [I-D.ietf-pana-ipsec]. In case the master key is not		protection such as link-layer or IPsec-based ciphering
readily useful to the ciphering mechanism, an additional secure		[I-D.ietf-pana-ipsec]. These mechanisms ultimately establish a
association protocol [RFC4306] may be needed to produce the required
keying material. These mechanisms ultimately establish a
cryptographic binding between the data traffic generated by and for a		cryptographic binding between the data traffic generated by and for a
client and the authenticated identity of the client. Data traffic		client and the authenticated identity of the client. Data traffic
must be minimally data origin authenticated, replay and integrity		must be minimally data origin authenticated, replay and integrity
protected, and optionally encrypted.		protected, and optionally encrypted. How cryptographic keys are
		generated from the PANA SA and used with a secure association
11.7. PAA-to-EP Communication		protocol is outside the scope of this document.
The PANA framework allows separation of PAA from EP(s). SNMPv3		11.6. PAA-to-EP Communication
[I-D.ietf-pana-snmp] is used between the PAA and EP for provisioning
authorized PaC information on the EP. This exchange MUST be always
physically or cryptographically protected for authentication,
integrity and replay protection. It MUST also be privacy-protected
when PaC-EP master key for per-packet ciphering is transmitted to the
EP.
The PaC-EP master key MUST be unique to the PaC and EP pair. The		The PANA framework allows separation of PAA from EP. SNMPv3
session identifier and the device identifier of the EP are taken into		[I-D.ietf-pana-snmp] MAY be used between the PAA and EP for
computation for achieving this effect [I-D.ietf-pana-ipsec].		provisioning authorized PaC information on the EP. This exchange
Compromise of an EP does not automatically lead to compromise of		MUST be always physically or cryptographically protected for
another EP or the PAA.		authentication, integrity and replay protection.
11.8. Liveness Test		11.7. Liveness Test
A PANA session is associated with a session lifetime. The session is		A PANA session is associated with a session lifetime. The session is
terminated unless it is refreshed by a new round of EAP		terminated unless it is refreshed by a new round of EAP
authentication before it expires. Therefore, at the latest a		authentication before it expires. Therefore, at the latest a
disconnected client can be detected when its session expires. A		disconnected client can be detected when its session expires. A
disconnect may also be detected earlier by using PANA ping messages.		disconnect may also be detected earlier by using PANA ping messages.
A request message can be generated by either PaC or PAA at any time		A request message can be generated by either PaC or PAA at any time
and the peer must respond with an answer message. A successful		and the peer must respond with an answer message. A successful
round-trip of this exchange is a simple verification that the peer is		round-trip of this exchange is a simple verification that the peer is
alive.		alive.
Skipping to change at page 71, line 33:
This exchange is cryptographically protected when a PANA SA is		This exchange is cryptographically protected when a PANA SA is
available in order to prevent threats associated with the abuse of		available in order to prevent threats associated with the abuse of
this functionality.		this functionality.
Any valid PANA answer message received in response to a recently sent		Any valid PANA answer message received in response to a recently sent
request message can be taken as an indication of peer's liveness.		request message can be taken as an indication of peer's liveness.
The PaC or PAA MAY forgo sending an explicit PANA-Ping-Request if a		The PaC or PAA MAY forgo sending an explicit PANA-Ping-Request if a
recent exchange has already confirmed that the peer is alive.		recent exchange has already confirmed that the peer is alive.
11.9. Updating PaC's IP Address		11.8. IP Address Spoofing
There is no way to prove the ownership of the IP address presented by		PANA does not provide any means to prove ownership of the IP address
the PaC. Hence an authorized PaC can launch a redirect attack by		presented by the PaC. Hence, an authorized PaC can launch a redirect
spoofing a victim's IP address.		attack by spoofing a victim's IP address. This problem and its
		solution are outside the scope of PANA.
11.10. Early Termination of a Session		11.9. Early Termination of a Session
The PANA protocol supports the ability for both the PaC and the PAA		The PANA protocol supports the ability for both the PaC and the PAA
to transmit a tear-down message before the session lifetime expires.		to transmit a tear-down message before the session lifetime expires.
This message causes state removal, a stop of the accounting procedure		This message causes state removal, a stop of the accounting procedure
and removes the installed per-PaC state on the EP(s). This message		and removes the installed per-PaC state on the EP(s). This message
is cryptographically protected when PANA SA is present.		is cryptographically protected when PANA SA is present.
12. Acknowledgments		12. Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Jari Arkko, Mohan Parthasarathy, Julien		We would like to thank Mark Townsley, Jari Arkko, Mohan
Bournelle, Rafael Marin Lopez, Pasi Eronen, Randy Turner, Erik		Parthasarathy, Julien Bournelle, Rafael Marin Lopez, Pasi Eronen,
Nordmark, Lionel Morand, Avi Lior, Susan Thomson, Giaretta Gerardo,		Randy Turner, Erik Nordmark, Lionel Morand, Avi Lior, Susan Thomson,
Joseph Salowey, Sasikanth Bharadwaj and all members of the PANA		Giaretta Gerardo, Joseph Salowey, Sasikanth Bharadwaj, Spencer
working group for their valuable comments to this document.		Dawkins, Tom Yu, Bernard Aboba and all members of the PANA working
		group for their valuable comments to this document.
13. References		13. References
13.1. Normative References		13.1. Normative References
		[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
		Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
		February 1997.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate		[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.		Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2131] Droms, R., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol",
RFC 2131, March 1997.
[RFC2234] Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax		[RFC2234] Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
Specifications: ABNF", RFC 2234, November 1997.		Specifications: ABNF", RFC 2234, November 1997.
[RFC2279] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
10646", RFC 2279, January 1998.
[RFC2365] Meyer, D., "Administratively Scoped IP Multicast", BCP 23,
RFC 2365, July 1998.
[RFC2462] Thomson, S. and T. Narten, "IPv6 Stateless Address
Autoconfiguration", RFC 2462, December 1998.
[RFC2464] Crawford, M., "Transmission of IPv6 Packets over Ethernet
Networks", RFC 2464, December 1998.
[RFC2988] Paxson, V. and M. Allman, "Computing TCP's Retransmission
Timer", RFC 2988, November 2000.
[RFC3315] Droms, R., Bound, J., Volz, B., Lemon, T., Perkins, C.,
and M. Carney, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for
IPv6 (DHCPv6)", RFC 3315, July 2003.
[RFC3456] Patel, B., Aboba, B., Kelly, S., and V. Gupta, "Dynamic
Host Configuration Protocol (DHCPv4) Configuration of
IPsec Tunnel Mode", RFC 3456, January 2003.
[RFC3588] Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and J.		[RFC3588] Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and J.
Arkko, "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 3588, September 2003.		Arkko, "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 3588, September 2003.
[RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H.		[RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H.
Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)",		Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)",
RFC 3748, June 2004.		RFC 3748, June 2004.
[RFC4086] Eastlake, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness		[RFC4086] Eastlake, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness
Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, June 2005.		Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, June 2005.
[I-D.ietf-ltru-registry]		[RFC4595] Maino, F. and D. Black, "Use of IKEv2 in the Fibre Channel
Phillips, A. and M. Davis, "Tags for Identifying		Security Association Management Protocol", RFC 4595,
Languages", draft-ietf-ltru-registry-14 (work in		July 2006.
progress), October 2005.
		[I-D.ietf-dhc-paa-option]
		Morand, L., "DHCP options for PANA Authentication Agents",
		draft-ietf-dhc-paa-option-04 (work in progress),
		September 2006.
[IANA] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an		[IANA] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434,		IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434,
October 1998.		October 1998.
13.2. Informative References		13.2. Informative References
[RFC2522] Karn, P. and W. Simpson, "Photuris: Session-Key Management		[RFC3315] Droms, R., Bound, J., Volz, B., Lemon, T., Perkins, C.,
Protocol", RFC 2522, March 1999.		and M. Carney, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for
		IPv6 (DHCPv6)", RFC 3315, July 2003.
[RFC4016] Parthasarathy, M., "Protocol for Carrying Authentication		[RFC4016] Parthasarathy, M., "Protocol for Carrying Authentication
and Network Access (PANA) Threat Analysis and Security		and Network Access (PANA) Threat Analysis and Security
Requirements", RFC 4016, March 2005.		Requirements", RFC 4016, March 2005.
[RFC4058] Yegin, A., Ohba, Y., Penno, R., Tsirtsis, G., and C. Wang,		[RFC4058] Yegin, A., Ohba, Y., Penno, R., Tsirtsis, G., and C. Wang,
"Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access		"Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access
(PANA) Requirements", RFC 4058, May 2005.		(PANA) Requirements", RFC 4058, May 2005.
[RFC4137] Vollbrecht, J., Eronen, P., Petroni, N., and Y. Ohba,		[RFC4137] Vollbrecht, J., Eronen, P., Petroni, N., and Y. Ohba,
"State Machines for Extensible Authentication Protocol		"State Machines for Extensible Authentication Protocol
(EAP) Peer and Authenticator", RFC 4137, August 2005.		(EAP) Peer and Authenticator", RFC 4137, August 2005.
[RFC4284] Adrangi, F., Lortz, V., Bari, F., and P. Eronen, "Identity
Selection Hints for the Extensible Authentication Protocol
(EAP)", RFC 4284, January 2006.
[RFC4306] Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol",		[RFC4306] Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol",
RFC 4306, December 2005.		RFC 4306, December 2005.
[I-D.ietf-eap-keying]		[I-D.ietf-eap-keying]
Aboba, B., "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key		Aboba, B., "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key
Management Framework", draft-ietf-eap-keying-09 (work in		Management Framework", draft-ietf-eap-keying-15 (work in
progress), January 2006.		progress), October 2006.
[I-D.ietf-pana-ipsec]		[I-D.ietf-pana-ipsec]
Parthasarathy, M., "PANA Enabling IPsec based Access		Parthasarathy, M., "PANA Enabling IPsec based Access
Control", draft-ietf-pana-ipsec-07 (work in progress),		Control", draft-ietf-pana-ipsec-07 (work in progress),
July 2005.		July 2005.
[I-D.ietf-pana-framework]		[I-D.ietf-pana-framework]
Jayaraman, P., "PANA Framework",		Jayaraman, P., "Protocol for Carrying Authentication for
draft-ietf-pana-framework-05 (work in progress),		Network Access (PANA) Framework",
July 2005.		draft-ietf-pana-framework-07 (work in progress),
		August 2006.
[I-D.ietf-pana-snmp]		[I-D.ietf-pana-snmp]
Mghazli, Y., "SNMP usage for PAA-EP interface",		Mghazli, Y., "SNMP usage for PAA-EP interface",
draft-ietf-pana-snmp-05 (work in progress), January 2006.		draft-ietf-pana-snmp-06 (work in progress), June 2006.
[I-D.ietf-mobike-protocol]
Eronen, P., "IKEv2 Mobility and Multihoming Protocol
(MOBIKE)", draft-ietf-mobike-protocol-08 (work in
progress), February 2006.
[I-D.ietf-dna-link-information]
Yegin, A., "Link-layer Event Notifications for Detecting
Network Attachments", draft-ietf-dna-link-information-03
(work in progress), October 2005.
[ianaweb] IANA, "Number assignment", http://www.iana.org.		[ianaweb] IANA, "Number assignment", http://www.iana.org.
[IANA-EXP]		[IANA-EXP]
Narten, T., "Assigning Experimental and Testing Numbers		Narten, T., "Assigning Experimental and Testing Numbers
Considered Useful", BCP 82, RFC 3692, January 2004.		Considered Useful", BCP 82, RFC 3692, January 2004.
Appendix A. Example Sequence of Separate NAP and ISP Authentication
A PANA message sequence with separate NAP and ISP authentication is
illustrated in Figure 12. The example assumes the following
scenario:
o The PaC initiates the discovery and handshake phase.
o The PAA offers separate NAP and ISP authentication, as well as a
choice of ISP from "ISP1" and "ISP2". The PaC accepts the offer
from PAA, with choosing "ISP1" as the ISP.
o NAP authentication and ISP authentication is performed in this
order in the authentication and authorization phase.
o An EAP authentication method with a single round trip is used in
each EAP sequence.
o After a PANA SA is established, all messages are integrity and
replay protected with AUTH AVPs.
o The access, re-authentication and termination phases are not
shown.
PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs]
-----------------------------------------------------
// Discovery and handshake phase
-----> PANA-PAA-Discover(0)
<----- PANA-Start-Request(x) // S-flag set.
[Cookie,
ISP-Information("ISP1"),
ISP-Information("ISP2"),
NAP-Information("MyNAP")]
-----> PANA-Start-Answer(x) // S-flag set.
[Cookie, // PaC chooses "ISP1".
ISP-Information("ISP1")]
// Authentication and authorization phase
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+1) // NAP authentication.
[Session-Id, Nonce, // (S,N)-flags set
EAP{Request}] // for all messages during
// NAP authentication.
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+1)[Session-Id, Nonce]
-----> PANA-Auth-Request(y)[Session-Id, EAP{Response}]
<----- PANA-Auth-Answer(y)[Session-Id]
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+2)[Session-Id, EAP{Request}]
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+2)[Session-Id, EAP{Response}]
<----- PANA-FirstAuth-End-Request(x+3)
[Session-Id, EAP{Success}, Key-Id, Algorithm, AUTH]
-----> PANA-FirstAuth-End-Answer(x+3)
[Session-Id, Key-Id, AUTH]
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+4) // ISP authentication.
[Session-Id, EAP{Request}, AUTH] // Only S-flag set
// for all messages during
// ISP authentication.
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+4)[Session-Id, AUTH]
-----> PANA-Auth-Request(y+1)[Session-Id, EAP{Response}, AUTH]
<----- PANA-Auth-Answer(y+1)[Session-Id, AUTH]
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+5)[Session-Id, EAP{Request}, AUTH]
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+5)[Session-Id, EAP{Response}, AUTH]
<----- PANA-Bind-Request(x+6)
[Session-Id, Result-Code, EAP{Success}, Device-Id,
Key-Id, Lifetime, Protection-Cap., PPAC, AUTH]
-----> PANA-Bind-Answer(x+6)[Session-Id, Device-Id, Key-Id,
PPAC, AUTH]
Figure 12: A Complete Message Sequence for Separate NAP and ISP
Authentication
Authors' Addresses		Authors' Addresses
Dan Forsberg		Dan Forsberg
Nokia Research Center		Nokia Research Center
P.O. Box 407		P.O. Box 407
FIN-00045 NOKIA GROUP		FIN-00045 NOKIA GROUP
Finland		Finland
Phone: +358 50 4839470		Phone: +358 50 4839470
Email: dan.forsberg@nokia.com		Email: dan.forsberg@nokia.com
Skipping to change at page 80, line 5:
Email: Hannes.Tschofenig@siemens.com		Email: Hannes.Tschofenig@siemens.com
Alper E. Yegin		Alper E. Yegin
Samsung Advanced Institute of Technology		Samsung Advanced Institute of Technology
Istanbul,		Istanbul,
Turkey		Turkey
Phone: +90 538 719 0181		Phone: +90 538 719 0181
Email: alper01.yegin@partner.samsung.com		Email: alper01.yegin@partner.samsung.com
Intellectual Property Statement		Full Copyright Statement
		Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).
		This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
		contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
		retain all their rights.
		This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
		"AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
		OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET
		ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
		INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE
		INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
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		Intellectual Property
The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any		The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to		Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to
pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in		pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
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on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be		on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be
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Skipping to change at page 80, line 29:
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specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at		specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at
http://www.ietf.org/ipr.		http://www.ietf.org/ipr.
The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any		The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary		copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
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This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
"AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET
ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE
INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006). This document is subject
to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and
except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights.
Acknowledgment		Acknowledgment